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PREFACE
Several years ago, as I read the minutes of a conference per­
taining to some problems between the United States and Great Britain,
I wondered about the many problems involved in any wartime international 
collaboration and how the leaders contrived a course of successful 
action. The question remained in my mind, as a kind of general topic 
for later study, until I was faced with the choice for thesis work.
Having been active in World War II and having been based in 
England during the finale of that Anglo-American enterprise, I chose 
to study the background and progress of the collaboration which caused, 
or rather, directed the forward action of which I was a part. The re­
sulting research led to the firm realization that national interests 
and respective leader interpretation of those interests guide the de­
cisions of international collaboration. In order to reduce the subject 
to manageable proportions, the view was narrowed to the really major 
figures, their formal meetings, and decisions for a primary action - 
the Second Front.
Just as progress in a great international undertaking requires 
support from the parties involved, so my work was supported by the 
gracious ladies of the Army Pentagon Library, who manage the reference 
department and who render all possible assistance in locating a vital 
reference, suggesting available source material, and listening to their 
"customers'" ideas.
ii
Dr. Leo B. Lott, Chairman, Department of Political Science, 
University of Montana, and thesis director, furnished valuable support 
in the area of Ideas, expression of those Ideas, and overall encourage­
ment during the final period of compilation.
Finally, my wife kept the spirit of completion alive when all 
the exigencies of daily living contrived to cancel the writing effort. 
She had a double and re-doubled task, for once having Father at the 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The record of relations between nations contains many examples 
of crises as well as periods of stability, and the eventual easing of 
tensions or furthering of cooperation is proportional to the satis­
faction of national interests. This results from the fact that national 
interests are what states seek to protect or gain in relations with 
other states. It has been suggested that "an ideal foreign policy con­
tains a systematic formulation of national interests in which . . . the 
interests have been judged against one another in terms of priorities 
and the interests as a whole have been budgeted against the power of the 
state to achieve those interests."^ If they act rationally, nations 
with common interests will cooperate so long as their action furthers 
respective national objectives. However, even in the best of cooperative 
international enterprises, where optimum commonality of purpose is vital 
to achievement of goals, there is still variety in approach and diver­
gence in opinion. Even those nations which have much in common cultur­
ally, linguistically, economically, as well as in broad national inter­
ests, experience difficulty in achieving agreement in matters of policy, 
procedure, and goals. A case in point is that of Anglo-American cooper­
ation during World War II.
^Frederick H. Hartman, The Relations of Nations, (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1957), p. S.
Essentially three elements or Influencing threads of philosophy 
extend throughout the period of Anglo-American cooperation and contribute 
most heavily to decisions made. The first of these Influencing threads 
Is typified by the philosophy and apparent motivation of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: his overriding concern for achieving world
peace by those methods embodied In President Woodrow Wilson's original 
Fourteen Points. Such was Roosevelt's primary objective In the Anglo- 
American cooperation. His was a long range goal. He was very careful 
to avoid direct conflict with his domestic political adversaries, 
because Isolationist political elements had destroyed Wilson's hope for 
control of war by International organization, and the President Intended 
to avoid the Wilson type of failure.
England's Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's philosophy and 
goals constitute the second dominant thread of Influencing factors. His 
primary goal was explicitly stated In the first speech he made following 
his elevation to power. "Our goal," Churchill said, "Is victory." 
Although the Prime Minister was admittedly a key figure along with 
Roosevelt In formulating the original statement regarding the Inter­
national organization which we call the United Nations, he was primarily 
motivated by the desire to attract to his cause the somewhat large and 
Influential segment of Internationalist thought prevalent In England.
This he did by encouraging the establishment of an International organi­
zation. During the early Anglo-American cooperation, the urgency of his 
Immediate problems and the danger his country faced just for survival 
claimed his attention much more than did consideration of post-war 
actions. However, to the degree Churchill gave thought to the means
of maintaining world peace, he favored the traditional balance of power, 
with Britain as the balancing nation.
The third set of influences affecting the decisions described 
herein was voiced by the military staffs of both nations and took the 
form of argument over proper military strategy, politics notwithstanding 
From the beginning of joint military planning, the British espoused a 
strategy derived from their historical experience as a nation and which 
was based on the concept of a strong navy to offset the deficiencies of 
a small army. By using their navy, they were able to mount various 
land offenses, attain their objective, and retire to their naval base 
of operations. This strategy allowed them to strike then at another 
place with fairly consistent success. The United States, on the other 
hand, was a large land power and looked upon the European war as a 
land war which would require large armies. The American strategy 
envisioned the build up of a powerful striking force with which they 
would mount a swift and overwhelming offensive. The nation's tremen­
dous productive capacity would insure an adequate flow of supplies, 
particularly since the supply route planned by the Americans would be 
by way of England and would be protected by the navies of both 
countries. Moreover, as Allied air power developed, with the potential 
of blunting, or stopping entirely, the German air arm, the attack 
could be launched sooner than envisioned by the British. Finally, 
the American battlefield psychology and experience was such that 
their techniques of land warfare called for rapid attacks with over­
whelming force.
It is not the author's intention to pass judgment on which 
decision should have been made or whether an alternative course of 
action would have been better. Numbers of peopl^-wfto are experts in 
hindsight deliberation have already done this. It is more useful to 
explore the way major decisions were made which led to the massive 
campaign called the Second Front.
Several accounts attest to the fact that production was vital 
to the prosecution of the war.^ Each nation was plagued by shortages. 
British capacity was strained to the limit well before the days of 
Lend-Lease. American productive capacity was not adequately organized 
and channeled at the time of Lend-Lease legislation. Therefore, the 
meshing of industrial and military might of England and the United 
States promised to be difficult. However, the essential problems lay 
in the realm of political and military decision making, basic strategy, 
and the achievement of national goals.
There seems to be general agreement among writers about the 
period that major differences did exist in this area of necessary
Ocooperation. Not only were national interest of Great Britain and 
the United States not identical in form or intensity, but powerful
^Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1949), II, pp. 494-501; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt 
and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 410.
O For a discussion of the differences in political interests and 
outlook, see Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the 
Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962)
p. xxxiv. For similar comment by an American, see Maurice Matloff and 
E. M. Snell, United States Army in World War II. War Department; Stra­
tegic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (Washington: Department
of the Army, 1953), pp. 29-30.
personalities were involved. The machinery for national decision 
making in each case was of different design, stimulus, and operation. 
Variations in major policy, both political and military, were ever * 
present in varying degree. There were numerous occasions when each 
party to the enterprise doubted the other's really effective contri­
bution to planning, execution, and peace procedures.
This study deals with the political policy as well as with 
military plans and associated actions. Such policy and plans provide 
the rationale for decision not only to strike the enemy, but more 
importantly, where and in what sequence to strike him for most damage to 
his war making capability.
The Anglo-American political cooperation had a definite existence 
as far back as 1939, when Churchill re-entered the British Cabinet in 
the Admiralty, much to the satisfaction of President Roosevelt.^ Like 
Churchill, Roosevelt had been prompt to realize the menace of Hitlerism, 
although he was far in advance of the strict neutrality sentiment prev­
alent at the time in American public opinion and in Congress.^ Cordial 
relations between the United States and Great Britain were earnestly 
encouraged by both men. With the fall of France, Roosevelt appeared to 
recognize that the die was cast and that England would require all the
^Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front 
1940-1943 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 30.
Alden Hatch, Franklin D. Roosevelt. An Informal Biography 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947), p. 245.
support the United States could provide if the British were to prevail.^
His convictions were constantly supported by encouraging and urgent
messages from Churchill. The latter roared at the enemy and inspired
British citizens to renewed optimism. Churchill knew, however, that
Britain by herself could not be victorious and that he must acquire as a
partner the former colony across the Atlantic if his stance in the face
of superior force was not to be undermined. Both men had domestic
problems at home which restricted their ability to make the international
2decisions they felt most appropriate at the time. Both had goals of a 
national caliber which had to be pushed aside at times in order to attain 
the cooperation essential, at least for the British, for survival. Both 
were strong leaders of democratic nations committed to the cause of 
individual freedom, but each had differing organizational forms and ideas 
for achieving the primary short range goal--victory, and long range 
goal— lasting peace.
Although political contact and agreement between the two leaders 
was relative simple to initiate and maintain, inter-governmental coop­
eration was quite another matter. Many members of the American Congress 
were far from convinced that their constituents desired close cooperation
1This is evident from the early encouragement of British pur­
chases of war supplies in spite of U.S. industry inability to furnish 
with any degree of timeliness the needs of its own growing military 
force. Then, as Britain announced the imminent exhaustion of her 
financial resources (November 1940), Roosevelt managed to push through 
Congress the Lend-Lease measure (signed into law March 11, 1941).
2For example, the Destroyer for Bases Exchange where England 
traded base rights on certain British islands to the United States for 
fifty over-age destroyers. Respective national governments had to be 
convinced that necessary quid pro quo was present.
with any remaining democratic government of Europe. An anxious press
1as well expressed doubt that the war in Europe was America's concern.
In addition to these strong policy doubts, American production through 
the summer of 1941, though potentially enormous, was insufficient to 
meet Lend-Lease demands or the United States military requirements.
Many members of the United States military establishment were pessimistic 
about the United States ability to reach a stage of military readiness 
in time to aid the British.^ General Marshall and Admiral Stark were 
among those to whose lot fell the task of proving that there was not 
only a need, but also a way of achieving that power base. Detailed
cooperation with their British counterparts was not smooth, but at least
the military goals were the same. Types of experience among the two 
national military leaderships were different. Ideas of strategy were 
dissimilar. Indeed, not until 1944 did they appear to coincide, and 
even then, overall strategy itself was not fully agreed to by both 
parties. The feelings of American military people involved in the 
negotiations were not improved by the constant pressures of the
politically-oriented Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins to provide for the
"hungry" British forces from the United States military table of supply, 
a meagre table in the earlier days, and especially so as the Pacific 
Ocean war progressed. As the United States Army Chief of Staff,
^See the digests of opinion in the New York Post, (September 4, 
1939); and the New York Times, (September 8, 10, 1939).
^Henry L. Stimson, and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in 
Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 376.
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General Marshall initiated consultations with the British military 
apparatus as far back as 1940 in the search for common understanding of 
England's needs. As requirements were established, Marshall bent every 
effort to meet them from such sources of supply as he found available. 
Hence, he was chagrined to see his hard-won supplies, obtained for 
previously agreed military actions, employed by the British in small, 
peripheral and, in his judgment, wasteful diversions.
In the interest of order, four major events, or combinations of 
events, will form the basis for this study. They represent key consid­
erations during the growing Anglo-American cooperation which led to a 
Second Front. The paper will consider the three elements of influence 
stated at the beginning and pertinent aspects of each event, i.e., 
personalities, circumstances, and some arguments; and finally, the 
impact of decisions made during one event on the succeeding events of 
the study.
The first episode culminates in the first high-level Anglo- 
American conference. This summit meeting took place at Argentia, 
Newfoundland, in August 1941, and was the first wartime personal contact 
between the President and Prime Minister. During the week of that 
meeting, there evolved the declaration of principles later known as 
the Atlantic Charter, which contained Roosevelt's philosophy.
The second event was a conference held in Washington in 
December 1941. Called at Churchill's request, it is noteworthy for 
its achievements. The Atlantic meeting had paved the way for partner­
ship: now the principals resumed where they left off. Churchill's
purpose In requesting the meeting when he did was to forestall any 
American inclination to shift their central interest from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Now tliat 
the United States was in the war, Churchill wished to reaffirm previously 
agreed Allied policy. A number of important decisions were reached, such 
as conmon strategy, acceptance of a blueprint of operations, priority of 
the war against Germany, and a declaration to the world of an association 
of United Nations. However, the most vital decision and keystone to 
future cooperation was the decision that henceforth, Britain and America 
were to run the war as one entity with military staffs combined at 
highest level to give single direction.
The third and perhaps most influential episode in this chronology
took place in Washington in June 1942. It followed in the wake of Soviet
Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov's visit to Washington during which
President Roosevelt had acceded to Molotov's request for a statement
saying that "full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent
tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942." There were
implications in this statement that the British were unwilling to under**
1write. In British eyes, the Americans were insisting on a dangerous 
and untimely campaign which might have disastrous results. To clarify 
their divergent views, the two countries undertook a series of conver­
sations which culminated in a second visit by Churchill to Washington 
beginning June 17, 1942. The British War Cabinet had earlier stated
^Sherwood, p. 577.
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firmly that they could not accept an invasion of France in 1942 and 
that if there were to be any semblance of such a second front as 
Roosevelt promised Molotov, it would have to be other than on the 
European continent. Churchill's purpose during the visit was to convince 
the President that a North African invasion was the answer. The eventual 
decision in this matter led to the well-documented sequence of decisions 
for follow on operations in the Mediterranean in accordance with British 
desires. American military leaders were chagrined, for they were con­
vinced that build up for a 1943 cross-Channel invasion was the best 
strategy.
The fourth episode or set of events pertains to the difficulties 
and arguments which arose between Great Britain and the United States 
in deciding the time and manner of fully engaging Germany in a true 
Second Front. The Quadrant and Cairo-Teheran conferences were the means 
of settling the differences and making decisions for this action of major 
importance to the Allied cause. Difference in military strategy were 
involved. Both nations recognized the necessity for a cross-Channel 
invasion of France. However, the British envisioned an Italian campaign 
to remove Italy from the war and at the same time cause a German diversion 
of forces to Italy from other fronts. If successful, such a course of 
action would weaken German opposition to the massive Allied cross- 
Channel effort to follow. The Americans, on the other hand, proposed 
the cross-Channel operation for an initial assault upon the Nazi-controlled 
area and were impatient with their British partner for the "unnecessary 
delay," which would be created by peripheral activities. The resulting
11
compromise has the markings of the most controversial decision of the 
overall cooperation, and writers of political and military strategy are 
still divided as to which side was right,^
For examples of those on the American side, see Samuel Eliot 
Morison, Strategy and Compromise (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1958), pp. 28-29; and Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemever Reports (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1958), pp. 228-234. For examples of those on 
the British side, see Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 9-13 passim; and Chester




Hans Morgenthau has expressed a theory of political power which 
has to do with a nation's interests. He says that "the concept of 
national interests presupposes . . . continuous conflict and threat of 
war, to be minimized through a continuous adjustment of conflicting 
interests by diplomatic actions."^ The importance of national interests 
and the interpretation of United States and British interests by 
respective national chiefs were noted in the introduction. Diplomatic 
action may assume a variety of forms. Furthermore, it may be conducted 
on a quite personal and informal basis, especially by highly placed 
government officials. Such personal diplomacy marked the relations 
between President Roosevelt and Pritne Minister Churchill during the 
period with which we are concerned, and most citizens of the two 
countries appear to have approved this close relationship as right and 
proper.
That these two leaders encouraged closer bi-lateral association 
during the late 1930's was not accidental; nor was the fellowship
Hans Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest




without some pattern. However, in order to illuminate the personal 
factors, as well as national objectives, which fostered the somewhat 
providential relationship, a sequence of background facts about both 
the President and the Prime Minister will be presented. In the process, 
it is appropriate that additional people who played vital roles in the 
Anglo-American cooperation of World War II be considered. This chapter 
is concerned with such facts and personalities. It is sub-divided in 
the interest of clarity.
Franklin D. Roosevelt: Pre-War Cooperative
Action and Long Range Goals
Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the United States presidential 
cloak of office in 1933 at a time when the Administration's problems 
were predominantly domestic. The Years of the Great Depression had 
seen the national economy virtually wrecked. At that time the average 
United States citizen was experiencing tenuous security. Governmental 
action on behalf of these people was sadly lacking.
The new President's close advisers were determined that solution 
of these knotty domestic issues would be the principal governmental 
objective. Roosevelt was in accord with their ideas for the national 
scene, for a basic tenet of his philosophy was "that the government 
should subordinate private interests to the collective good and substitute 
cooperation for selfish individualism. He had always hated the tremendous 
inequality in the distribution of wealth and ardently desired to correct 
it."^ However, Roosevelt had been in the Wilson government and was also
^Hatch, p. 169.
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in sincere sympathy with the tenets of humanitarian philosophy as Wilson 
had felt it should be applied to the world. The new President was also 
well aware of the international system of which the United States was a 
part.
During the 1933 Disarmament Conference, Roosevelt proposed that, 
in exchange for disarmament agreement, the United States would enter into 
a consultive pact. This would promise conference with signatories when 
one of them claimed aggression had occurred, but it would leave the 
United States free to decide for itself whether aggression was a fact 
justifying the application of economic sanctions. President Hoover had, 
during his latter days in office, requested of Congress legislation to 
empower the President to embargo the shipment of arms to aggressor nations, 
and in mid-April 1933 the House of Representatives passed the resolution. 
Roosevelt's consultive pact plus the Congressional resolution for a 
discriminatory arms embargo would build a special annex of the League 
of Nations for the United States in which it could cooperate for 
collective security without conmitment or loss of sovereignty.
The Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, apparently fearing 
loss of sovereignty and resisting involvement in European power politics, 
amended the measure so as to remove the discriminatory clause and require 
instead that the embargo would apply to all parties to a dispute. Since 
such a law would render impossible United States cooperation in economic 
sanctions against aggression and, therefore, make a consultive pact
15
useless, rather than risk its passage, the administration dropped the
resolution and it was not voted on.^
With this example of strong isolationist influence before hfm,
it did not take the President long to realize the need to soft pedal
his enthusiasm for world cooperation. Although he agreed with Woodrow
Wilson's great plan, he was determined to avoid a public misunderstanding
or run the risk of a rejection of any similar plan. Therefore, he under-
2took a long campaign to re-educate the American people.
The "educational" process which ensued was fraught with problems,
for a large and vocal isolationist element extended throughout the nation.
Nevertheless, when Hitler announced the rearmament of Germany in 1935,
Roosevelt protested and said "we cannot build a wall around ourselves
and stick our heads in the sand." Then, in January 1936, he declared
3 'that "peace is threatened by those who seek selfish power." Still 
later, in 1937, when Japan, Germany, and Italy combined forces, he spoke 
1"The heart of the argument was that isolationists during the 
period between the two World Wars asserted the impossibility of the 
United States taking part in collective action against an aggressor 
without forming 'entangling alliances' . . . which would destroy the 
sovereignty of the United States and permit other nations to determine 
its policy and even plunge it into war against its will." Basil Rauch, 
Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York; Creative Age Press, 
1950), p. 2.
^Hatch, p. 232. The friendly biographer tends to imply a 
Roosevelt conviction that the United States would become obligated to 
action in Europe. I agree with Professor Langer that during this period, 
the President had no such conviction. Rather, he was anxious that the 
United States be prepared for its obligations as a leader in world af­
fairs, not merely an observer. William L. Langer, and S. Everett Gleason, 
The Challenge to Isolation; The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American 




out in warning and defiance as he marked the shift to direct alignment
i
and overt planning for defense in the struggle between fascist and
democratic states:
The peace loving nations must make a concerted effort in oppo­
sition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of 
humane instincts which today are creating a state of interna­
tional anarchy and instability from which there is no escape 
through mere isolation or neutrality . . . the will for peace 
on the part of peace loving nations must express itself to the 
end, that nations which may be tempted to violate their agree­
ments and the rights of others will desist from such a course.
Repercussions from diverse sources across the land resulted.
Time Magazine reported the opposition as being:
From the Wall Street Journal which front-paged an editorial 
'Stop Foreign Meddling; America Wants Peace'; from World 
Peaceways and five other passive-peace organisations; from 
Senator Gerald P. Nye, sponsor of neutrality legislation; 
from columnist Hugh Johnson who wrote 'Well, here we are 
again, taking sides in a war.
The following week. Time added "Franklin Roosevelt's major job in
Washington is to deal with the reverberations, political and intema-
3tional, that followed his announcement." Always a politically 
sagacious man, Roosevelt gave way before the great clamor of public 
disapproval. However, his convictions that resistance to dictatorship 
was a necessity did not change. Hence, he waited for public acceptance 
of the logic of his global politics.
^President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Quarantining War," Vital 
Speeches of the Day. IV (October 15, 1937), 2-4.
^Time, October 18, 1937, pp. 17-19. 
^ i m e . October 25, 1937, p. 17.
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Some eighteen months later, in July 1939, the President tried 
again, as he urged the repeal of the Arms Embargo section of the Neu­
trality Act. Even the strong support of this effort by Secretary of 
State Hull was to no avail however, and Congress denied the request. 
Congressional isolationists, such as Gerald P. Nye and William Borah, 
remained adamant in their stand against such a move,^ confident that 
there was no danger of war. Roosevelt's determination to resist Hitler's 
program of European dismemberment was demonstrated by his proclamation 
of a Limited National Emergency in September 1939. In November, his 
policies achieved partial success when he succeeded in obtaining 
Congressional approval for changes in the Neutrality Act to permit the 
sale of war munitions to democracies on a "cash and carry" basis.^
As a follow up to this success, Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State, on a fact finding tour of European capitals.
The tour took place just after the first of the year in 1940. Welles 
brought back an alarming report. There was to be a strong German 
offensive in the spring of that year; one the Allies were in no con­
dition to meet. Although the President was certain that, without sub­
stantial United States aid the Allied cause would be lost, he also 
realized that the nation was not as yet convinced of the lesson he had 
to teach. The deteriorating European situation contributed to Roosevelt's 
decision to attempt the unprecedented third term race for office as 
President of the United States.
^Of primary importance to England and France was the repeal of 
the embargo on sale of arms. By the time of passage, the bill had been 
so thoroughly debated that Mr. Arthur Krock observed that the Senate had 
"bored itself and the country at large." (The New York Times. October 29, 
1939).
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The expected German spring offensive exploded into being. The
Nazis occupied Denmark in April and stormed into Norway soon thereafter.
♦
A month later, their mechanized might stunned Europe and by May 14, 
"pierced the thin shell of France's fortified line. The Roosevelt 
message to Americans, until then largely ignored, got through. The 
country was in danger! At last, as Roosevelt spoke to the joint session 
of Congress on May 16, 1940, he was able to convince the nation of what 
he and the military staff had known for years. In addition to the sober 
accounting he gave of the steps needed to strengthen our military forces, 
he saw as vitally necessary an enormous increase in production. He set 
a goal more ambitious than anyone before had imagined. He was moving 
the nation on a course for support of warring nations. Such support 
would eventually involve millions of Americans under arms.
The question might be asked: What sort of man was this President
who brought his nation from an attitude of isolation and strict neutrality 
to a conviction that the ideals of freedom were just as important in 
Europe as elsewhere in the world? One writer submits that the chief 
reasons Roosevelt was admired and trusted— loved if you will— by a pre­
ponderance of the common, ordinary citizens of the United States were 
his optimism, his sympathy, and his ability to take them into his 
confidence. They were a part of his responsibility; he did not consider 
himself to be their responsibility. During those early years of his 
administration, the President "made the unemployed, the dispossessed.
^Hatch, p. 259.
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the underprivileged feel that he cared," and the programs he sponsored 
did not betray those for whom and to whom he appealed. "Roosevelt 
believed the American society could be improved. He felt the same way 
about the world scene, and when war came, he set out to provide a means 
for nations to live in prosperity and peace. His pattern was the Wilson 
philosophy up-dated to the needs of ,the current world.
Roosevelt demonstrated other attributes as well, which are not
so idealistic. He did enjoy power and the exercise of it. He could be
arbitrary, stubborn, and dilatory. He wore the presidency like a cloak.
It was his office; it did not own him. Therefore, he manipulated the
affairs of state, established ^oals, and was not necessarily orthodox
or traditional in his methods of achieving his objectives. In foreign
affairs, he sometimes strained the limits of constitutional authority,
2but being an astute political technician, he shaped the broad lines of 
his desired policies in conjunction with the legislative body and 
coordinated with public opinion— as close a taskmaster as his actions 
would acknowledge.
The President permitted quarrels in the official family and often 
by-passed his cabinet officers, but there was often method in this loose
^Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt 1932-45. 
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 8-10.
2Samuel Morison has suggested that Roosevelt "had a political 
calculating machine in his head, an intricate instrument in which Gal­
lup polls, the strength of armed forces, and the probability of England's 
survival; the personalities of ... congressmen; the Irish, German,
Italian, and Jewish votes; ... were combined with fine points of political 
maneuvering." Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American 
People (New York; Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 995.
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procedure. By surveying the opinions of a large number of imaginative 
and competent minds at other levels of authority, Roosevelt established 
in his own mind a conviction as to what should be, and aligned it with 
what his experience and judgment as a politician told him it could be. 
The result was a policy, essentially his, but susceptible to adjustment 
as trusted members of his staff or others might suggest. It is to a 
consideration of one of these trusted contemporaries that we now turn.
Winston Churchill:
His Background for Cooperation and Goals
Although the Roosevelt story is far from complete, it is appro­
priate to stop at this point, for it is during the period of late 1939 
and early 1940 that the personal diplomacy so important to our study 
really began. We must now consider pertinent facets of the Churchillian 
background.
Rarely had the British people been so united in going to war as 
in 1939. Winston Churchill gave expression to the feelings of these 
people in the last speech he made as a private member of the House of 
Commons :
We are fighting to save the world from the pestilence of Nazi 
tyranny and in defense of all that is most sacred to man. - 
This is no war for imperial aggrandizement or material gain.
It is a war to establish on impregnable rocks, the rights of 
the individual. It is a war to establish and revive the 
stature of man.
With such demonstrated awareness of the people's feelings, 
Churchill was recalled to the government in an atmosphere of general
Lewis Broad, The War That Churchill Waged (London; Hutchinson, 
1960), p. 17. Hereafter referred to as Broad.
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acclaim. His dynamic energy and the fame of his anti-appeasement 
speeches made him the man of the hour in Britain as he returned to his 
old place in the Admiralty in September 1939. Heartened by a United 
States Presidential message of congratulations, Churchill replied at 
once. Thus began the long correspondence which paved the way to close 
understanding and personal diplomacy between the central figures of 
these two nations.
Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940. The phrases of his
speech presenting his Ministry to the House of Commons established his
policy, his aim, and his dedication:
I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat . . .
Our policy? . . .  to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, 
never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue-of^humaH" 
crime. That is our policy. Our aim? . . <^it is victory, 
victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory 
however long and hard the road may be - for without victory, 
there is no survival.^
Continuous bad news plagued the Prime Minister and the New 
Government: the German breakthrough, no reserves, the French defeat.
But in the press of problems, Churchill informed Roosevelt that "What­
ever might happen, the British in their island would fight on to the
end. But if the Americans were able to render assistance, 'if it is
to play any part it must be available soon'."^ The pressing need was 
for arms. Washington received a formal British appeal for help and
responded in such a way that the United States Army was deprived of
^Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), pp. 25-26.
2Broad, p. 36.
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all but the minimum essentials. Rifles, machine-guns, and field guns
with ammunition w6re shipped to Britain. The American decision to take
vigorous action was based on Roosevelt's evaluation of Churchill's *
steadfast character. The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull,
attested to this fact as follows : "The President and I were convinced
that under Churchill's indomitable leadership Britain intended to fight
on. We believed that Mr. Churchill meant what he said, Had we had any
, 1doubt we would not have taken the steps we did."
The American willingness to believe in Churchill might be
attributable to his position of power in his nation. Certainly, as the
"first" of the British Ministers, the Prime Minister (Churchill or some
other) acquires power from the fact that he selects the members of his
Government. Further, he alone, of all the Ministers, may make great
decisions without the approval of the full Cabinet. A comparison of
the Prime Minister's position with that of the American President is
made as follows;
The Prime Minister, because of the concentration of respon­
sibility in the Cabinet and the discipline of British parties, 
has, as a general rule, far greater powers than the President, 
whose freedom of action is severely limited by the separation 
of powers, but the President can usually exercise his powers 
far more independently as an individual than can the Prime 
Minister. The British executive is a plural executive, in 
spite of the predominance of the Prime Minister.%
^Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan
Co., 1948), Vol. I, pp. 744-745.
^Samuel H. Beer, and Adam B. Ulam (ed.). Patterns of Government ; 
The Major Political Svstems of Europe (New York: Random House, 1962),
pp. 116-117.
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Regardless of Churchill's influence in government by virtue of 
the Constitutional position he occupied, however, Roosevelt was also 
well acquainted with Churchill's position as a persuader in his country 
among the British people. Just as presidential power in the United States 
depends in large measure upon the individual's ability to persuade, so 
in the final analysis, did Churchill's authority stem from a political 
base dependent upon the will of the people as represented in the House 
of Conmons.̂  That Prime Minister Churchill could persuade and more than 
not convince the mass of England's population in resisting the German 
threat clinched the President's decision for aid. Thus Roosevelt, by his 
action, gave Churchill his own personal vote of confidence.
At the time Churchill formed his first Ministry, he was head of 
a government but not of a political party. Although it was customary 
for a Conservative Prime Minister to lead his Party, Churchill would not 
permit his predecessor, Neville Chamberlain, to surrender as leader of 
the Tories. A compelling reason is taken from his letter to Chamberlain; 
"As Prime Minister* of a national government, formed on the widest basis 
and comprising three parties, I feel that it would be better for me not 
to undertake the leadership of one political party." Having made the
Churchill alluded to this in his first speech to the American 
Congress on December 26, 1941, when he said: "I have steered confidently
toward the Gettysburg ideal of 'government of the people, by the people, 
and for the people'. I owe my advancement entirely to the House of 
Commons, whose servant I am . . . O n  any day, if they thought the people 
wanted it, the House of Commons could by a simple vote remove me from my 
office." Charles Bade, The War Speeches of The Right Honorable Winston S. 
Churchill (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1952), p. 145.
^Broad, p. 53.
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Party administration secure by retaining its nominal leader, Churchill 
could devote himself to the primary task of marshalling his forces to 
defeat Germany. Considering himself to be especially well qualified«in 
military matters, he assumed the post of Minister of Defense. Although 
it was unusual for a Prime Minister to assume responsibility for a 
subordinate position as well, Churchill has explained his rationale;
Power in a national crisis, when a man believes he knows 
what orders should be given, is a blessing. In any sphere 
of action there can be no comparison between the positions 
of number one and number two, three, or four . . .  It is 
always a misfortune when number two or three has to initi­
ate a dominant plan or policy. He has to consider not only 
the merits of the policy, but the mind of his chief . . .
There are always several points of view which may be right, 
and many which are plausible. I was ruined for a time being 
in 1915 over the Dardanelles, and a supreme enterprise was 
cast away, through my trying to carry out a major and cardi­
nal operation of war from a subordinate position. Men are 
ill-advised to try such ventures. This lesson had sunk into 
my nature . . .  At the top there are great simplifications.
An accepted leader has only to be sure what it is best to do, 
or at least to have made up his mind about it.l
Churchill's powers and responsibilities as Defense Minister were, 
like the British Constitution, undefined. Hence, they became very much 
what he wanted them to be; as extensive as the exigencies of the war 
dictated. Having his own conception of how a war should be run, he 
was determined that decisions should be reached swiftly, and resulting 
orders should be issued promptly and obeyed. During the previous war, 
Lloyd George had a small War Cabinet as a management tool. Churchill also 
had a War Cabinet, but he used it only as the executive authority. The 
direction of vital affairs, such as planning and control of military 
operations, was lodged with him through and together with the Chiefs
^Churchill, II, pp. 15-16.
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of Staff; that is, the professional heads of the three military services •* 
Navy, Army, and Air Force. This Chiefs of Staff Committee, as it was 
called, was the operational authority for conducting the war. As 
Defense Minister, Churchill was its guiding force. The arrangement 
resulted in the Prime Minister's having full control over the British 
handling of the war. Although he and the Chiefs of Staff Committee were 
subject to decisions of the War Cabinet and the House of Commons, he was 
prompt and conscientious in placing pertinent matters before these bodies. 
As a result, there was seldom any interference from them, and no Prime 
Minister before him had exercised such direct authority in the military 
sphere.̂
Neither did Churchill have cause to worry about his parliamentary
position, at least for the first six months of his tenure as Prime
Minister, for the sense of national peril silenced criticism. He had
promised the nation only that his Government would be resolute against
tyranny and that every effort would be bent towards ensuring national
survival. Therefore, the disasters of 1940 were borne in Parliament
with stolid resignation. Continued reverses of 1941 brought forth
breaks in the silence, but the Prime Minister's critics found little
support in the House of Commons, which registered confidence in the
2Government by a vote of 447 to three.
1Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill; The Years of Achievement 
(New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1963), p. 67. Hereafter referred to
as Broad, Years. Also see pp. 195-197 for Churchill's account of duties.
^Broad, p. 92.
26
Churchill could view with satisfaction his domestic political 
situation, and he could be reassured in the knowledge that his ideas 
and vision would receive full consideration in British war councils.
But the defeat of Germany required more than purely British sources 
could provide. The channel of communication with the American President 
was the Prime Minister's most valuable hope. As long as he had access 
to the American leader, Churchill would be able to assist in the design 
of Hitler's eventual destruction. Therefore, the Prime Minister was 
ever alert to ways for influencing his Atlantic neighbor toward active 
participation in the war to save mankind.^ Churchill's primary goal 
remained always one of victory.
Other Key People: Their Place in the
Cooperative Role
That Roosevelt and Churchill were men of vision, politically 
astute, and extremely competent in achieving agreement with their points 
of view is evident from the several accounts of their accomplishments. 
Furthermore, they clearly shared a vital national interest - the defeat 
of Nazi Germany. However, their vision, their ability to achieve, and 
the realization of national interests came to fruition predominantly 
through the contributions of thought and action of loyal military 
leaders. This is not to detract from the exceptional support rendered
See Appendix I for example of Churchill's effectiveness in this 
respect. It is his letter to the President dated December 8, 1940, 
"vigorously stating Britain's position, needs, arid the war prospects 
for 1941 . . .  It proved a powerful advocate for the policy of Lend- 
Lease." (Hull, Memoirs. II, pp. 920-922).
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the nation during this period by those more specifically oriented to 
politics, such as Harry Hopkins, but in time of war political and 
military actions are so closely akin as to be intertwined.
The American military personalities, who stood out as key figures 
in the early Anglo-American cooperation, were General George Marshall 
and Admiral Harold Stark, Chiefs of Staff respectively for the Arny and 
Navy. Although Marshall remained throughout the war. Admiral Ernest King 
replaced Stark soon after Pearl Harbor. Secretary of War Henry Stimson 
and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox were effective Cabinet personnel, and 
as such were vital to proper coordination of functions between the 
political element and the purely military establishment.
As had France and Britain, the United States in 1939 had looked
on helplessly as Germany swiftly defeated the Polish forces. In spite
of Roosevelt's efforts to change the situation, the twin ills of
complacency and unpreparedness which had plagued France and Britain
were United States afflictions too. Marshall and Stark had little
time for shoring up defenses, in spite to the American ocean defenses
and modest military forces. In addition, they had to fight against
great odds, for isolationist forces were still strong. Even Roosevelt
recognized the necessity for moving the nation carefully or not at all
The task which Marshall faced at the end of 1939 seems unbelievable in
retrospect. His biographer sums up as follows:
Seventeenth in rank among the world's amed forces, the United 
States Army retained from World War I only the luster of its 
fighting reputation. Weapons, effective in the Meuse - Argonne 
were obsolescent; many officers lacked proper training or had 
stagnated; the allotment for training in the late thirties.
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amounting to approximately two per cent of the Army's 
appropriations, was insufficient to keep the Regulars in 
shape or give the National Guard a real concept of field 
duties; and the lack of equipment and personnel for existing 
units held them below authorized peacetime strength. Worse 
still. Congress in its legislation reflected the national 
conviction that enforcement of the neutrality laws was 
sufficient to prevent war from touching the Western Hemi­
sphere".^
In 1939, during the early period of American neutrality, the 
military men had been engaged in strengthening defenses in the Carib­
bean and the Atlantic. A different orientation emerged when Japan 
moved toward expansion in the Pacific. The fleet was ordered to re­
main at Pearl Harbor rather than return to the west coast bases. The
United States now looked to the British and French fleets to hold the 
2Atlantic.
The defeat of France brought with it a problem not the least 
of which was guarding two oceans in the event Britain failed to hold 
out. Marshall, Stark, and their advisers were especially concerned 
at the latter prospect. Therefore, in August 1940, at the suggestion 
of the President, a quick tour of inspection was made of British in­
stallations by American military representatives. An optimistic 
evaluation of Britain's long term chances of survival resulted. More 
importantly, the tour fostered the conviction in military circles of
^Forrest C . Pogue, George C. Marshall Ordeal and Hope (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1966), pp. 6-7.
2Americans had consistently, either consciously or unconsciously, 
looked to England for patrol of major trade routes of the world. As far 
back as 1937, Lippman discussed this phenomenon of United States de­
pendence upon Great Britain. (Walter Lippman, "Rough Hew Them How We 
Will," Foreign Affairs, XV, July 1937, pp. 587-594).
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both nations that a periodic exchange of information between Britain 
and the United States was desirable and should be accomplished on a 
regular basis. Therefore, in November 1940, Admiral Stark formally 
proposed that :
The United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret staff 
talks on technical matters with the British and Canadians . . . 
to reach agreement and lay down plans for promoting unity of 
Allied effort should the United States find it necessary to 
enter the war.^
During this same period. Admiral Stark's counterpart in the British 
Navy, Admiral Found, expressed the view that there should be conversations 
in Washington with War and Navy Department Staffs.^ At first, Marshall 
was noncommittal concerning the suggestion. Lacking a fighting force 
that could contribute heavily to any offensive policy within the next 
eighteen months, he wished to proceed cautiously. Still, he agreed with 
Stark that the United States military forces needed to know something of 
British capability just as the British should know what to expect from 
the United States forces. If such information were not exchanged in
3advance, "we would start with no basis at all if war developed later on." 
As a result of the consensus in the United States and British military 
staffs, American-British Conversations (ABC) took place in Washington 
from January 29 to March 29, 1941.
Mark S. Watson, United States Army in World War II, The War 
Department. Chief of Staff; Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington: 




The opening statement by the Americans at the first ABC meeting
revealed that for them the conversations were:
To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the 
United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and 
the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled 
to resort to war.l
To avoid any possible suggestion of official commitment by the United
States, the President carefully took no part in the proceedings, and
Marshall and Stark, after appearing briefly at the opening session,
2were absent thereafter.
The report of the British and American representatives at the 
ABC sessions was later approved by the British Government, and although 
the President declined to give it formal United States approval, both 
nations treated it as a fairly specific statement of understanding by 
the military service leaders. In summarizing the points of agreement, 
we find that the United States was interested primarily in hemisphere 
defense and the maintenance of Britain's position in Europe. Running 
through American conclusions were threads of British strategy, such as 
operations to remove Italy from the war, a major air offensive and minor 
amphibious raids against German controlled areas, and the encouragement 
of resistance groups in occupied Europe. Only for the undetermined 
future could they speak of a build up for a final offensive against 
G e r m a n y .3 Although this document was not a formal pledge, its
^Excerpt from statement by Stark and Marshall at opening of the 
conference. Copy in War Plans Division (WPD) 4402-94 and WPD 4402-89 
as cited by Watson, 372.
2Watson, p. 374.
3por more complete account, see Watson, pp. 376-380.
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provisions went far toward specifying the type of war the United States 
would wage if it entered the conflict with Germany. Robert Sherwood 
concluded correctly that the conversations and exchange of opinions 
"provided the highest degree of strategic preparedness that the United 
States or probably any other nonaggressor nation has ever had before 
entry into war Thus the American military leaders laid a foundation 
for future war planning and cooperation with Great Britain.
At the same time early United States military coordination was 
being effected with Great Britain, another key American figure, Harry 
Hopkins, was active in a similar vein on the political front. Hopkins 
was perhaps Roosevelt's closest confidant and adviser. Until 1941 he had 
been engaged in the service of other Departments or agencies of the 
Government. However, beginning in 1941, Hopkins chief involvement with 
the President related mainly to the conduct of military affairs and 
included his work in administering the Lend-Lease Act. Further, and of 
utmost importance, were his several important missions to confer with 
Churchill and Stalin as the President's personal representative.^
In January 1941, while the secret ABC military discussions were 
in preparation, Roosevelt sent Hopkins to his first meeting with the 
Prime Minister. Just as those visits by United States military repre­
sentatives, during the previous August, were to acquire factual
^Sherwood, p. 273.
^Hopkins made five trips to visit Churchill and two to Stalin, 
the last to Stalin being for President Truman in May 1945. (See Index 
'^Hopkins, Missions," Sherwood, p. 969).
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information, so was Harry Hopkins "to gain first hand knowledge of 
Britain's needs and of finding a way to fill them."^ The mission to 
Churchill had its beginning in a lengthy letter from the Prime Minister 
to Roosevelt dated December 8, 1940. This document vigorously stated 
Britain's position and needs and war prospects for 1941.^ The President 
was deeply troubled by the implications it raised for England's survival. 
He knew that concerted action was required in some areas but felt much 
of the problem "could be settled if Churchill and I could just sit down 
together for awhile." Hopkins suggested that, since the President 
couldn't be away from the country at that time, he, Hopkins, might visit 
Churchill in the President's place. "If I had been to England and seen 
it with my own eyes, then I might be of some help."^
It was during this visit with Churchill that Hopkins became well 
acquainted not only with the Prime Minister, but also with the moral 
fiber supporting England in her ability to make war and with the British 
war making requirements which the United States could support. Perhaps 
the most important result of the visit, however, was the conviction he 
could take back to Roosevelt;
Churchill is the Government in every sense of the word . . .
Churchill wants to see you - the sooner the better . . .
I am convinced this meeting between you and Churchill is
^Sherwood, p. 236.
^Churchill, II, p. 458. Also see Appendix I. The Prime Minister 
has referred to the letter as being one of his most important.
^Sherwood, p. 230.
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essential . . . .  This island needs our help now, Mr. President, 
with everything we can give them."!
Summary of Prelude
This chapter has served to provide a setting for Anglo-American 
collaboration, which in December 1941, was suddenly made completely 
overt and direct. Contacts between British and ihnerican political and 
military chiefs of both nations had by that time been established. 
Although not official, sound basic military coordination had been 
effected and at least informal agreement had been reached about how 
the United States would wage war against Germany if she became compelled 
to do so.
We have seen that both Roosevelt and Churchill were leaders of 
their nations in the literal sense of the word. Both had breadth of 
vision necessary to plot courses of action calculated best to serve 
respective national interests. Realizing that they could travel the 
inevitable war route more effectively as allies, they guided their 
national destinies to a common meeting ground.
Through personal contact, Churchill kept the President so in­
formed of the British plans and needs that the President was able to 
fashion the domestic political atmosphere in the United States in a 
way most suited to support Great Britain's war makine^essentials. 
Although not discussed in the main body of the^chapter, two examples 
of the President's political shrewdness in this regard are the exchange 
of United States destroyers for lease rights to British controlled bases;
^Sherwood, p. 243.
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and the Lend-Lease Act, which enabled the United States to provide 
Britain the machines of war on a loan basis. Both programs of action 
were at such odds with the American policy of neutrality that some 
discussion of citizen reaction to them is appropriate here.
The Destroyer for Bases agreement of September 1940 provided 
Britain fifty over age destroyers in exchange for base rights to 
selected British owned Atlantic islands, use of which would improve the 
United States defense posture. The general public considered the deal 
an admirable bargain, even though it seemed to border on an Anglo- 
American alliance.^ The terms of the agreement were so favorable to 
the United States that initially there was little disposition in Congress
Oto criticize it. Isolationist alarms were certainly sounded. For 
example, the St. Louis Post Dispatch ran a full-page advertisement in 
the New York Times and other papers on September 4, 1941, saying 
"Mr. Roosevelt today committed an act of War."^ However, the position 
of the isolationists was sorely weakened by their long advocacy of 
action to acquire bases in these same islands.^ That they showed less
^"This trade gives notice that the democracies have the courage 
and foresight to help each other effectively." (Christian Science Moni­
tor, September 4, 1940); The deal gave the United States "a stockade of 
steel to the East." (New York Herald Tribune, September 4, 1940); for 
public opinion generally see survey of opinion of The New York Times, 
September 1, 1940.
2See summary in The New York Times, September 4, 1940, and 
The Congressional Digest, January 1941, 17 ff.
3For complete account of "The Destroyer Deal" see William L. 
Langer, and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation (New York; 
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1952), pp. 742-776.
^The Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1940, repeated a long-standing 
proposal to acquire British possessions in settlement of war debts.
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than usual inclination to make an issue of the transaction is illustrated
in the words of an unnamed Senator:
Listen, you can't attack a deal like that. If you jump on the 
destroyer transfer, you're jumping on the acquisition of defense 
bases in the Western Hemisphere. And the voters wouldn't stand 
for that. Roosevelt outsmarted all of us when he tied up the 
two deals.1
The idea of Lend-Lease was conceived purely and simply as a means 
to aid Britain., The Churchill letter of December 8, 1940, to Roosevelt 
(see Appendix I) brought into clear focus for the President the 
distressing material conditions which faced England. The Prime Minister 
submitted essentially two propositions. First, that control of the
oceans by the United States and Britain "is indispensable to the security
. . . and the surest means of preventing war from reaching the shores of 
the United States." Secondly, "the moment approaches when we shall no 
longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies.
Roosevelt's practical answer to Churchill was the submission of
a bill to Congress which would provide a program:
To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, or otherwise dispose 
of defense articles to the government of any country whose defense 
the President deems vital to the defense of the United States. . . 
This merchandise to be settled for as the President deems satis­
factory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or 
repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect 
benefit which the President deems satisfactory.3
^New York Post, September 9, 1940.
^Churchill, II, p. 476.
Excerpt from the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, as discussed 
by Basil Rauch, p. 295.
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The isolationists immediately condemned the bill as a "blank 
check." Senator Burton K. Wheeler declared: "Never before has the
Congress of the United States been asked by any President to violate 
international law . . .  It means war, open and complete warfare."^
However, after a two month debate in Congress, when the final 
vote was taken, the measure passed by 317 to 171 in the House and by 
60 to 31 in the Senate. If, as it seems reasonable to assume. Congress 
reflected the opinion of the country, the American people were ready to 
assist Britain.
Taking such action as these two examples illustrate enabled 
Roosevelt not only to provide more effective aid to the nation who 
had become America's first line of defense, but al^sg^-throngh~the re­
sulting massive Governmental procurement programs, he could begin 
marshalling his own nation's vast productive resources before the 
advent of an almost inevitable war.
^Congressional Record (77th Congress: 1st Session),' Vol. 87,
pt 10 (Appendix), p.A 178-179, as cited in Rauch, 304.
CHAPTER III
THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE: CLOSER ASSOCIATION
AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER
This chapter outlines a view of the primary Anglo-American 
issues of the Atlantic, conference, some of the processes in arriving 
at conference decisions, and selective impacts these decisions had 
upon the progressive cooperation of the two English-speaking nations 
in defeating the Nazis. That conference was the first of periodic 
personal contacts between the President and Prime Minister. It was a 
dynamic step in an ever growing collaboration between the two heads of 
government.
With the establishment of a broad framework of contacts and 
procedures for both Lend-Lease supply and limited military support of 
the British, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed 
in mid-1941 on the necessity for personal conversations regarding 
international policy. Inasmuch as the two national leaders had agreed 
in principle to such collaboration as was encompassed by the Lend-Lease 
Act, Roosevelt and Churchill were likely to be very much in accord on 
other courses of common action as well, such as aid to Russia, or 
resistance to Japanese aggression. However, personal association seemed 
to offer the most promise for clear understanding of, and differing 
approaches to mutual problems.
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Harry Hopkins was responsible in some degree for bringing this
face to face association to fruition. It will be remembered that he
%had discussed with Churchill in January 1941 the need for such a 
personal exchange of views between the two men. The date mentioned at 
that time was March or April. However, the President found it impossible 
to leave the country before April, and by that time the Prime Minister 
could not leave England because of war crises in Greece and Crete.
Hence, it was not until July, while Hopkins was on his second mission 
to England, that early August was set as the time and Argentia Harbor 
in Newfoundland as the place for the Atlantic Conference.
Churchill reflected in his account:
A conference between us would proclaim the ever closer associ­
ation of Britain and the United'States, would cause our enemies 
concern, make Japan ponder, and cheer our friends. There was 
also much business to be settled about American intervention 
in the Atlantic, aid to Russia, and our own supplies, and above 
all, the increasing menace of Japan.^
Roosevelt approached the conference with firm opinions concerning 
what the Anglo-American relationship should be. He was also aware of 
the Prime Minister's desires for early American military action. In­
cluded in the President's convictions were that American production 
effort alone would not enable Britain to win the war. "He, Churchill, 
knows that to mount an offensive, he needs American t r o o p s . A n o t h e r  
problem of weighty concern to Roosevelt was the matter of freedom of
^Churchill, III, p. 427.
^Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan, and
Pearce, 1946), p. 24.
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international trade, particularly as it was affected by Empire prefer­
ence trade agreements, which had long existed. During the same conver­
sation, from which we quoted above, Roosevelt told his son, Elliot:
We've got to make clear to the British from the very outset that 
we don't intend to be . . . used to help the British Empire put 
of a tight spot, and then be forgotten forever. . . » America 
won't help England in this war, simply so she will be able to 
continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples.!
There is evidence of action to insure the presence of suitable 
political and military talent on each side as plans for meeting took 
final form. When Roosevelt learned that the British Chiefs of Staff 
Committee would be present, he advised the Prime Minister that he would 
bring Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and General Arnold.% Since such 
representation would provide the primary "opposite numbers" on respective 
military staffs, Roosevelt's selections were appropriate. Later, when 
Churchill advised he would bring Permanent Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Roosevelt added to the American 
party. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and Averill Harriman.
The latter had just returned to Washington from London where he had been 
sent to expedite Lend-Lease supplies to the British. Perhaps there was 
nothing premeditated in Roosevelt's decision to bring Harriman along, 
other than to have readily available the best-informed opinion; however', 
since the President seemed confident that the Prime Minister would urge
^Roosevelt, p. 24.
^General Henry Arnold was in command of the United States Army 
air arm of that day which later became the Army Air Force. Thus, Arnold 
represented the United States on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as 
on the Combined Chiefs of Staff when that body came into being.
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an immediate American declaration of war against the Nazis,^ Roosevelt 
may have deliberately planned a campaign of resistance to the Prime 
Minister's eloquence. Certainly, both Hopkins and Harriman were 
currently informed, Hopkins having arrived (with Churchill's party) 
from a remarkable two-day conversation with Stalin,% and Harriman having 
recently toured British field units in Africa and the Middle East.
The business at hand was begun almost immediately on arrival of 
the two parties at Placentia Bay. In the afternoon of the first day, 
Welles and Cadogan engaged in establishing mutual understanding of major 
topics to be considered. The President's and Prime Minister's first 
meeting, before the official opening of the conference, was more for 
acquaintance and relaxation than anything else. Roosevelt entertained 
Churchill and his party at dinner that evening. Although the dinner was 
far from a formal conference atmosphere, it was during this time that 
the two leaders, and Hopkins, Welles, and Cadogan began serious dis­
cussions. Conversation was wide-ranging. However, sufficient time 
was spent on two main topics to insyre a common basis for work by 
pertinent staff members. The first pertained to the growing menace of 
Japanese aggression in the Pacific, which the British held to be of 
primary concern. The second topic was the proposed joint declaration 
which was to become the Atlantic Charter. Detailed discussion of these 
subjects is taken up later in this chapter.
^Roosevelt, p. 24.
2During the whirlwind visit to Moscow, Hopkins "had gained more 
information about Russia's strength and prospects than had ever been 
vouchsafed to any outsider." (Sherwood, p. 343).
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Accounts indicate that Churchill held the center of attention 
during that first evening gathering; primarily, because Hopkins wanted 
the President to hear "one of Churchill's after-dinner analyses of the 
war s i t u a t i o n . I n  his eloquent manner, Churchill presented the British 
position, and how close to defeat his nation had actually moved. Although 
confident in the hardihood of his fellow citizens, he made no effort to 
conceal his anxiety regarding American decisions. "The Americans must 
come in at our side! You must come in, if you are to survive I W h e n  
Roosevelt suggested the Russians as a factor in deterring German victory, 
Churchill expressed conviction that Russian resistance, though commendably 
sturdy and surprising, would cease in a relatively short time. The 
Prime Minister seems to have had two objectives at this single sitting.
The first was to convince the President of the urgency in declaring war 
against Germany. The second was to counteract any American tendency to 
increase aid via Lend-Lease to Russia. Roosevelt listened but at the 
time made no comment in reply to Churchill's plea.
Officially, the talks between Roosevelt and Churchill' began oh 
August 11, 1941. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins, and Sumner Welles 
were present at the first meeting. Early in this period the Prime Minister 
raised the topic of Japanese military expansion in the Far East. His 
initial recommendation was that the United States, Britaiju_and the 
Netherlands simultaneously issue a warning to Japan that further military
^Sherwood, p. 353. 
2Roosevelt, p. 30.
42
expansion on her part would lead to counter measures by the three 
governments named, even though such counter measures might result in
war between them and Japan. There was a corollary-'to this warning in­
cluded in Churchill's suggestion. It was to the effect that should 
Great Britain assist the Netherlands, as a result of Japanese aggression 
against the Netherlands East Indies, the President would request 
Congressional authority to assist the British and Dutch in defense 
against the Japanese aggression.
Both Churchill and Cadogan had already discussed the problem with 
Welles and had provided him and the President copies of suggested drafts 
of parallel communications along the above lines for presenting to the 
Japanese government. Churchill did not think there was any other re­
maining possibility of deterring Japanese expansion farther to the south, 
in which event war between Great Britain and Japan would result. Welles 
has recorded Churchill's emphatic belief that "if wardid break out 
between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position 
. . .  to cut the life-lines between the British Dominions and the British 
Isles unless the United States herself entered the war . . . The blow 
to the British Government might be almost decisive.
Both the President and Welles also felt that war with Japan should 
be avoided as long as was reasonably possible. But they were reluctant 
to use such a "mailed fist" approach as urged by Churchill; they thought 
it might be better to provide some element of "face-saving" for the
^Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), Vol I, pp. 355-356.
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Japanese. Therefore, rather than submit the somewhat blunt statement as 
proposed by the Prime Minister, they proposed to tell Japan that only 
withdrawal from her expansion program would justify the lifting of 
United States trade sanctions against her. However, the United States 
would, in a friendly spirit, seek to explore the possibilities for 
reaching a friendly understanding between the two governments. Churchill 
agreed to this procedure. He also concurred in the President's 
suggestion that the United States and Britain be prepared to advise 
Japan that neither the United States nor Britain had aggressive 
intentions with regard to Thailand. By following the above course of 
action, Roosevelt felt that Japanese aggression which might lead to 
war "could be held off for at least thirty days."^ Churchill was more 
optimistic, feeling that, with an expression of firm resolve to the 
Japanese, there was a resonable chance for avoiding war in the Pacific 
altogether.
Preparation of the United States-proposed Joint Declaration was 
to require more time than did the discussions concerning Japan. The 
President was eager to issue a document that would declare the broad 
principles which prompted Anglo-American cooperation in the world. There 
would be strong political overtones in any such declaration, and these 
two masters of the political art applied extreme care in producing a 
statement which would have the desired results in respective domestic, 
as well as international, political circles. One example of compromise 
arose over Roosevelt's desire to make clear that no future commitments
^Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, p. 360.
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had been made during the meetings. His objective was to render it 
impossible for isolationist elements in the United States to allege 
conclusion, of secret agreements. Churchill understood this aspect of 
the President's problem, but he demurred in favor of a positive statement 
that discussions had been solely of "questions relative to the furnishing 
of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the 
Lend-Lease Act."^ The President agreed with Churchill's recommended 
change, because he could then refer questions of secret agreements to 
his initial public statement.
Following this agreement on the initial statement, the two leaders 
turned their attention to the draft of the proposed Joint Declaration.
Two points of the document were controversial in varying degree. The 
first concerned freedom of trade. This had been a topic of conversation 
between Roosevelt and Churchill during an intimate gathering the second 
evening of the conference. At that time, the President had emphasized 
his conviction that much of the backwardness in the undeveloped areas of 
the world was due to British Empire trade agreements, which gave England 
a favored position in dealing with the British Dominions and Colonies. 
Roosevelt had long been certain that "if we are to arrive at a stable 
peace, it must involve the development of backward countries . . . (and 
that) the structure of peace demands, and will get, equality of peoples. 
Equality of peoples involves the utmost freedom of competitive trade.
At the time of that informal discussion, Churchill had taken issue with
^Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, p. 361.
^Roosevelt, pp. 36-37.
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the President's stand, because he felt there could be no tampering with
Empire agreements. Later, when the question was raised at the formal
session, both sides of the issue were discussed in detail. The draft of
the point in question, as presented by Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of
the United States Department of State, read as follows:
Fourth, they (the United States and Great Britain) will endeavor 
to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrim­
ination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials 
of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.^
The President and Welles voiced recognition of the adverse effect 
the phrase, "without discrimination and on equal terms", might have on 
British Empire preferential trade agreements. However, the phrase, "they 
will endeavor to further", initiated the point; hence, there was not 
implied an immediate binding obligation on the part of His Majesty's 
Government. The Prime Minister indicated personal agreement with the 
proposal, for he had always opposed the underlying Ottawa agreements.
He went on to point out the evils of the United States tariff walls as 
well. Furthermore, both he and Cadogan agreed with Welles that phrase­
ology was not the question. Rather, the need was for "a policy of 
constructive sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the 
creation of a new and better world, and that except through an agreement 
upon such a policy by our two governments, there would be no hindrance 
to a continuation later to the present German practices of utilizing . . . 
trade and financial policies in order to achieve political ends
^Foreign Relations, I, p. 361.
^Foreign Relations, I, p. 362.
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However, regardless of his personal convictions, Churchill was 
without authority to agree upon the point as stated for inclusion in 
the proposed declaration. This was due to the necessity for British 
Government, as well as Dominion, agreement, which, if possible to obtain 
at all, would require so much time as to delay issuance of the declaration 
until after news of the meeting had been released to the world. The 
Prime Minister then suggested a revision in wording, approximately as 
follows; "Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their 
existing obligations, to further, etc."^ He felt he might obtain 
approval from his government if such a change were made. Although Welles 
felt the value of the point was thus seriously reduced, if not destroyed, 
the President agreed to the redraft of the fourth point as recommended 
by Churchill.
The second point requiring resolution of differences pertained 
to what became point Eight in the final draft of the Joint Declaration. 
Although both the original American and British draft versions had in­
cluded a provision for some form of international organization, the 
draft Roosevelt preferred omitted such reference because of the 
suspicions and opposition he feared such a statement would create in 
the United States. Churchill initially agreed to the revised text.
Later, however, since he felt that some opinion in England would be 
disappointed at the absence of any stated intention to establish an 
international organization for keeping peace after the war, he proposed 
further modification of the text. This involved insertion of the
^Foreign Relations, I, p. 361.
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phrase "pending the establishment of a wider and more pemanent system
of general security." Roosevelt finally agreed; hence, the concluding
point of the declaration read as follows:
Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the world, for 
realistic, as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the 
abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be 
maintained If land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed 
by nations which threaten, or may threaten aggression outside 
their frontiers, they believe, pending, the establishment of a 
wider and permanent system of general security,! that the dis- 
armament of such nations Is essential. They will likewise aid 
and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten 
for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
Thus, the seed of the United Nations organization was first 
planted, not by Roosevelt but by Churchill. Point Eight In the charter, 
as well as the others to varying degrees, made the document historic. 
Although the United States and Great Britain never regarded the 
declaration as a formal State Paper or Treaty, through Its Issuance, 
they firmly assumed new moral responsibilities within the world. 
Roosevelt was eager to do just this. However, he had not felt the 
United States political climate was ready for a forthright statement 
of his desire.
The Chiefs of Staff discussions at the Atlantic Conference 
produced little of Importance. No agenda had been prepared, and there 
had been no specially prepared exchange of views. The British had hoped 
for discussion of major problems In strategy, but the Americans, with 
Admiral Stark as primary spokesman, had no authority to exceed tentative 
agreements already made. Their main Interest was In connnectlon with
1 Italics mine.
^ Foreign Relations, I, pp. 368-369.
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Lend-Lease priorities and production schedules as affected by develop­
ments on the Russian Front. In this regard. General Marshall reminded 
the British Chiefs of the mounting pressure upon the United States for 
munitions, now that Lend-Lease supplies for Russia caused a large un­
programmed and additional drain on existing production resources.^
Since Admiral Stark at the outset requested the conference be 
restricted to discussions only,^ he suggested that the American staff 
would require time to analyze the British review of the war situation. 
Therefore, there is little evidence of such hearty military cooperation 
as was enjoyed between the Chiefs of State.
However, upon return of the Chiefs of Staff to Washington, General 
Marshall asked the War Plans Division (WPD) to examine the British report, 
and to comment upon it. Several members of the WPD responded, and all 
who did were unanimous in their opposition to the British views. The 
British had stated: "The intervention of the United States would
revolutionize the whole situation."3 Their rationale for such a belief 
included such factors as the easing of the sea-shipping losses; the 
ability of American forces to prevent enemy penetration in Morocco and 
West Africa; and the assumption that the United States could assume 
commitments in the Atlantic Islands. The WPD consensus can be expressed 
in Colonel (later General) Wedemeyer's contention that "we must not
^Watson, p. 405.
^Watson, p. 404. 
^Watson, p. 402.
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become an active belligerent until we have created the means by which 
we can accomplish our national o b j e c t i v e s . T h e  staff considered that 
with her undeveloped army strength of those days, the United States 
would be of more assistance in supplying munitions.
Another British proposal had relegated the land offensive to 
some vague future time, following concentrated naval and air action.
The latter action ostensibly would beat down German resistance to such 
a degree that large land forces would be unnecessary. This idea was 
also unacceptable to the Americans. They interpreted in the British 
Chiefs' review only minor attention to preparation for land operations, 
and instead of agreeing with the British view, emphasized that "naval 
and air power may prevent wars from being lost; and by weakening enemy 
strength, may contribute greatly to victory . . . but it should be 
recognized as an almost invariable rule that wars cannot be finally won 
without the use of land armies.
The differences in military strategy as exemplified by the above 
discussion continued on a recurring basis throughout the Anglo-American 
collaboration until achievement of firm commitments for cross-Channel 
attack of Germany were eventually agreed in late 1943. Of course, there 
was continuing and earnest effort in both countries to compromise in the 
common interest. However, the military arguments, during and after the 
Atlantic Conference, served at least one constructive purpose. They 
warned the British of the strong views held in Washington, and provided
^Watson, p. 406. 
2Watson, p. 408.
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unmistakable evidence that the United States was likely to be the 
controlling partner in any coming alliance.
In retrospect, the primary accomplishments of the Atlantic 
Conference were political in nature. Most important to the success of 
future cooperation was that the two Chiefs of State were able to 
establish a deep personal relationship and firm understanding, which 
would be vital in the days ahead. This understanding was to enable an 
easy attitude in collaboration and international decision-making. 
Although both men may have had different objectives in mind for the 
declaration which became the Atlantic Charter, they mutually decided 
upon its content, agreed upon its implications, and appear to have tried 
to comply with its spirit. The degree of influence the document had on 
respective peoples of the world in changing the course of war-time 
events is impossible to assess with accuracy. However, the moral 
philosophy expressed bound the nations in a cause from which they never 
faltered until the defeat of their common enemy was assured. The move 
toward a Second Front had begun.
CHAPTER IV
THE ARCADIA CONFERENCE; ALLIED GRAND STRATEGY 
AND THE UNITED NATIONS
The Anglo-American parallel warnings to Japan, which Churchill 
recommended during the Atlantic Conference, were never made. The Prime 
Minister undoubtedly hoped for a strong stand by the United States 
against Japanese aggression.^ However, the President returned to the 
United States to find a middle course of warning to Japan more appro­
priate. This was due to recurring Japanese requests for a meeting be­
tween Roosevelt and Japanese Prime Minister Konoye, to discuss Far 
Eastern problems. Such meetings also failed to materialize, because 
the Japanese were unwilling to participate in pre-conference discussion 
of the fundamental principles with which such a meeting would deal. 
Japan's insistence on holding the meeting and leaving the "details" for 
later consideration created suspicion in the United States Department of 
State.2 Nevertheless, the record reflects consistent diplomatic effort 
by the United States to avoid war with Japan. The hard line was 
considered, as was the soft. Since a middle course was attempted,
^In his account of the final conference to the British War 
Cabinet on 12 August 1941, he referenced the warning to Japan and con­
cluded with "One would always fear State Department trying to tone it. 
down; but President has promised definitely to use the hard language." 
(Churchill, II, p. 446).
%ull, II, pp. 1023-1024.
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only to have it fail, arguments for either untried extreme can be 
advanced. However, the reality is clear, the United States and British 
political and military plans for the Pacific, in existence at the close 
of the Atlantic Conference, were wrecked in early December 1941
This chapter has to do with succeeding steps taken in Anglo- 
American cooperation during the first Washington Conference. Convened 
at Churchill's request, it took place during the last week of December 
1941, following the attack on Pearl Harbor. During conference delib­
erations, or as a result of them, Churchill's hope was realized, and 
decisions on grand strategy were made. Of primary concern to Roosevelt, 
was the firm declaration for unity among the nations allied agaTnst the 
Axis.
Roosevelt's primary aim was also realized by the issuance of the 
declaration of the United Nations. Also, agreement was reached re­
garding the application of unity in command for respective theaters 
having joint forces. Finally, it was at this conference that the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff became an important entity as the future 
executive body for the direction of the joint Anglo-American war effort, 
and decision was made to form the extremely vital Munitions Allocations 
Board. How such conference decisions were reached will be discussed 
and where pertinent the effect of such decisions on later cooperation 
will be explored.
Accounts of how Roosevelt and Churchill viewed the Japanese 
attack against the United States vary in detail. However, there is 
enough similarity in basic material to conclude that both men experienced
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some feeling of relief that it had occurred. At least, now the die was 
cast. The firm commitment of the United States to war following the 
attack on Pearl Harbor solved a number of political problems for both 
men.
In the United States, the voices of isolationism were muted.
The nation's massive production capacity could now be geared to full 
capacity, for production was no longer merely "a matter of aid to 
foreigners."^ Furthermore, the full development of the nation's military 
potential became a matter of national pride rather than a necessary evil.
Churchill could now point to the friend or partner as an ally.
The two nations were no longer prevented from welding their capabilities 
into an effective force. In British eyes, the joint effort could best 
be guided by her hard experience of recent years. Churchill felt that 
this close merging of capabilities was even more urgent. During previous 
Anglo-American consultations, agreement had been reached that accounts 
must first be settled with Hitler in Europe. However, the violence of 
the Japanese attacks in the Pacific, and the disaster at Pearl Harbor 
raised doubts in the Prime Minister's mind that Americans would hold to 
the original priorities. Therefore, the foremost item on Churchill's 
agenda was to seek United States reaffirmation of a policy of defeat 
Germany first. Convinced of the necessity to pursue such a policy, 
Churchill and his advisory staff worked in their usual singleness of
I
^Robert Sherwood expresses Harry Hopkins' feelings in Roosevelt 
and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 410, "We could not 
have even an adequate production program until the automobile and other 
industries could be converted from a peacetime basis to meet the require­
ments of total war - until the American people as a whole, realized that 
production was not merely a matter of aid to foreigners, however deserving 
they might be, but a matter, of life or death for their own sons."
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purpose to prepare arguments to support this policy. At least one 
account reflects that Churchill's Initial presentation of the subject 
to Roosevelt was the evening of the day he arrived In the United States.
Before the Prime Minister could bring forth his arguments, how­
ever, the President advised him of agreement: "We know them (the argu­
ments) as well as you do. The fact Is that we could beat Japan and 
still lose the war, but It Is Inconceivable that we could defeat Germany 
and not thereafter crush Japan.
This major decision of policy seems to have been easily made.
It seems that Roosevelt by himself could decide the Issue for his nation, 
now that a state of war existed. Of course this was not the case even 
though there was no thorough-going American political and military 
consultation organization In existence at that time. Although there 
had been some semblance of consultation between the War, Navy, and 
State Departments through the Standing Liaison Committee, even this 
committee ceased to function with any purpose after November'1940, 
because the President began at that time to deal directly with his 
chiefs of staff. He even by-passed respective Departmental Secretaries. 
A few officials like Harry Hopkins were normally the only persons 
other than the military chiefs who had access to such combined political 
and military discussions as the President conducted. In August 1941, 
the President did convene a War Council consisting of State, War, and 
Navy Secretaries plus the Chiefs of Staff, but this Council "hardly
^Hatch, p. 299.
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served . . . for mixing military and political views. Rather it 
provided the President with a platform from which to announce decisions 
already reached with the help of the Chiefs of Staff.
The decision expressed by Roosevelt to Churchill was based on 
extensive Anglo-American military staff conferences and such political 
considerations as the President wished to include. Therefore, the 
American military opinion that operations against Germany should have 
priority was in firm consonance with Roosevelt's ready agreement with 
Churchill. It is to be noted that there were instances where the 
President acted without the advice of his staff, for he liked to trans­
act even international business on a personal basis, which sometimes led 
to embarrassing commitments or misunderstandings. He also had a tendency 
to become interested in side issues of military strategy and often might 
encourage courses of military action which, in the opinion of his 
military advisers, were dangerously divergent from a sound strategic 
plan. This "tangential strategy" often resulted in consternation among 
military staff members. Such deviation from agreed views was especially 
likely where sponsorship of the British cause was personally conducted 
by the Prime Minister, as during the Arcadia meetings, which the first 
Washington conference was called. The Chiefs and Departmental Secre­
taries often felt fortunate in being able to call upon Harry Hopkins 
to arrange some opportunity for persuading the President to follow 
through with decisions he and the Chiefs of Staff had made.
^Harry H. Ransom (ed.). An American Foreign Policy naader 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1965), p. 137.
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Even Hopkins was disturbed during the Arcadia meetings by the 
President's inclination to accept casually some of the Prime Minister's 
proposals. An incident of this sort occurred shortly after the English 
visitors arrived. During an evening meeting with Churchill and some of 
his advisers, Roosevelt agreed to discuss the possibility of allotting 
to the British certain reinforcements originally intended for the 
Philippines with the understanding that such action would take place 
only if it proved impossible to get the reinforcements to General Douglas 
MacArthur, who was in command of United States forces in the Pacific.
The move appeared to be practical, but it was interpreted by the United 
States military staff, as a British effort to write off the Philippines 
in favor of Singapore. The immediate problem stemmed from the fact that 
the American staff members were not appraised of the idea until the head 
of the British secretariat called for a meeting of the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff to consider the proposal. Marshall, Arnold, and Eisenhower^ 
immediately protested to Secretary of War Stimson that the President had 
apparently made serious military commitments without staff advice. This, 
in turn, resulted in an angry call by Stimson to Hopkins warning that 
"if Roosevelt persisted in this type of decision making he would need 
a new head of the War Department."^ When Hopkins found a propitious 
moment to mention Stimson's concern to the two leaders, they denied that
^At the time, Eisenhower was assigned to the Army War Plans 
Division. He became Commander of the North African forces in 1942, and 




any such arrangement had been made. But when Stimson later read to 
Roosevelt extracts from a British secretary's record of the informal 
discussions in question, the President realized the impropriety of his 
action and quickly assured his military advisers that he had no intention 
of depriving MacArthur of men or supplies.^
Having achieved consensus regarding the fundamental priority of 
defeating Germany first, Churchill could readily acquiesce to a proposal 
near to the President's heart. As a foundation to the future, Roosevelt 
had proposed that all twenty-six nations at war with the Axis accept the 
principle's of the Atlantic Charter in a public declaration. Remembering 
the unhappy result of Wilson's failure to obtain international commitment 
while the war raged, the President wanted to obtain agreement during the 
period of stress and peril which existed in December 1941. Thus, the 
formation of the grand coalition of the Allies was among the first 
order of business.
Secretary of State Hull was instrumental in formulating the 
declaration. His Department worked out the details of the United 
States' draft just as they had the draft of the earlier Atlantic Charter. 
The first draft of the document, which was to become the Declaration of 
the United Nations, contained three specific points to be agreed upon 
by signatory nations. The first pledged the application of full 
governmental resources against the Axis until the latter was defeated.
The second promised full cooperation to effect coordination of effort
^Stimson Diary, 25 December 1941, as cited by Pogue, p. 266.
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and resources against common enemies. The third assured that there 
would be no separate armistice with the common enemy except by common 
agreement of the signatory nations.
At Hull's behest, a second document was prepared which suggested
the creation of a Supreme War Council. Upon presenting this latter
document to the President, Hull said:
It seems essential to provide machinery which will effectively 
coordinate the use of resources and the military effort, making 
suitable allocation between theaters of war, keeping continuous 
check on the execution of war plans, and if possible, achieving 
unified command in theaters where this is feasible.1
Churchill has indicated that he and the President "repeating 
our methods in framing the Atlantic Charter, prepared drafts of the 
declaration and blended them together. A l t h o u g h  the blending of their 
ideas concerning the final document certainly transpired, the Prime 
Minister's statement over-simplifies the process. Hopkins had some 
pertinent suggestions of far-reaching significance. He felt that every 
effort should be made to include religious freedom in the document.
He also made note that Russia would be reluctant to sign unless the 
wording employed acknowledged that she was not at war with Japan.
Hopkins displayed remarkable sensitivity to the possible reaction of 
respective allies, such as Russia and China, when he suggested that 
their names be placed within the document near those of the United 
States and Great Britain.^ it is revealing of the close bond between
Ĥull,, II, p. 1118. 
^Churchill, III, p. 664. 
^Sherwood, p. 448.
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Hopkins and the President that the latter forwarded these Hopkins 
suggestions, as though they were- his own, to Hull for incorporation 
within another draft of the paper.^
Secretary Hull and appropriate members of his staff incorporated 
the suggestions and discussed the amended document with British Ambassador 
Halifax prior to a conference between the President, the Prime Minister, 
and themselves that same evening (December 27, 1941). Halifax agreed 
with Hull that the provision in the document for a Supreme War Council 
was appropriate. Since Roosevelt and Churchill were not in agreement 
that such a council should be formed at the time, that provision was set 
aside. The remaining provisions were then handed to the Russian 
Ambassador, Litvinov, for comment by his Government.
Churchill had wished to substitute for the phrase "the govern­
ments signatory hereto" the word "authorities". His purpose was to 
permit the inclusion of the Free French, and although neither Hull nor 
the President wished to. take the Free French into the fold in place of 
the Vichy government, the President had overruled Hull's arguments and 
agreed to the word "Authorities". Litvinov refused the change, because 
"the approval of the Declaration was an approval by the Government in 
contradistinction to the Foreign Office, and no ambassador of Russia 
has the power to agree to any textual change."2 Although Litvinov then 
cabled his Government for approval, which was granted, the agreement must
^Hull's account in his Memoirs, II, 1120, reflects these Hopkins 
recommendations as though they were the President's words. Hull gives no 
credit for them to Hopkins. Hence, I think he was unaware of Hopkins' 
part in this instance.
2Sherwood, p. 449.
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have arrived too late, for the word "Authorities" did not appear in the 
published Declaration. The changes in the text requested by Russia 
were negligible and apparently were due to her reluctance even to imply 
any sort of commitment against Japan.
All Russian revisions were accepted, including even her wish to 
substitute for the words "the defeat of members of adhérants of the 
Tripartite Pact" the phrase "the struggle for victory over Hitlerism."
The Soviet ambassador justified the latter by telling Hull "the word 
'Hitlerism' with his country includes Nazism, Fascism, and Japanism."^ 
That Russia's suggestions were so readily accepted is significant. For 
even at this early stage in relations, Roosevelt was beginning to woo 
Stalin's support in arranging for peace keeping capability.
By the time major revisions had been made, the Declaration of 
the United Nations contained two points rather than the three Cordell 
Hull had originally submitted to the President. They read as follows;
(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, 
military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite 
Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.
(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Govern­
ments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or 
peace with the enemies.%
On the first day of the new year, 1942, representatives of the 
United States, Great Britain, and China signed the document. The sig­
natures for the remaining twenty-two nations aligned against the Axis 
were affixed during the following day, and the United Nations Organization
^Hull, II, p. 1122.
2h u 11, II, p. 1124.
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was born. Although the signatory nations were in fundamental agreement,
the objectives of Great Britain and the United States, at least, were at
variance. Roosevelt was;
Serving notice that his nation would not agree to the establish­
ment of spheres of influence, alliances, and all the other 
trappings of traditional diplomacy after the conclusion of the 
war. The President wanted to pave the way for United States 
leadership of a new organization of countries which would re­
place power politics.!
Churchill, on the other hand, was intent on protecting British 
interests in the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and Asia. His search was 
still for victory. He seemed to feel, at least initially, that the 
British could now draw on the United States manpower and weapons as if 
these had been swept into a common pool for campaigns tailored to suit 
the interests and convenience of Great Britain. As indicated in his 
account of the deliberations, "the issuance of a declaration could npt 
by itself win battles, but it set forth who we were and what we were 
fighting for."2 Hence, he certainly had no objection to the declaration 
of purpose, even though his purpose might differ from that of Roosevelt.
Although decisions on grand strategy and proclamations of Allied 
unity were important results of the Arcadia meetings, the military 
staffs bropght into being an equally important command arrangement for 
waging-war by the two allies. This was in two parts: First, was an
agreement by the two nations that the forces in each theater would be 
commanded by a supreme staff in accordance with the principle of unified
^Donald Brandon, American Foreign Policy; Beyond Utopianism and 
Realism (New York; Appleton-Century-Croft, 1966), p. 73.
Zchurchill, III, p. 683.
62
command. Secondly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of each nation would serve 
as a Combined Chiefs of Staff to direct the entire military course of 
the war. Such an arrangement would permit complete exchange of infor­
mation between both national staffs and insure coordination at all major 
planning and operational activities. Churchill has suggested that future 
historians may consider this setting up of unified control as the most 
valuable result of the December 1941 meetings.^ Certainly, it was the 
most important from the military point of view.
General Marshall was the most firm advocate of unity in command.
To his lot fell the burden of convincing not only the British, but also 
the United States Navy as well. His first opportunity to splak for the 
appointment of a single commander in a theater of operations was 
December 25, 1941, and was with reference to the Pacific theater. He 
contended that "only a commander responsible for the whole theater could 
decide the question of allocation of defense forces . . .  We cannot 
manage by cooperation . . .  If we can make a plan for unified command, 
now, it will solve nine-tenths of our t r o u b l e s . H e  soon realized that 
by failing to prepare conference representatives for such close inter­
national cooperation, he might have jeopardized its acceptance. Admiral 
Stark was noncommittal. The British were unwilling to discuss the matter 
without sounding out the Prime Minister. Therefore, the next day, Marshall 
outlined his plan of command to Secretary of War Stimson and obtained 
enthusiastic concurrence. Following this, the two men obtained presi­
dential approval and presented the detailed outline to a special meeting
^Churchill, III, p. 686.
2pogue, p. 276.
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with Navy Department representatives. Although there was some reluctance, 
Marshall's arguments won agreement. With his position now clearly out­
lined and supported by the President and the Navy, Marshall resumed his 
plea to the British Chiefs of Staff.
This time the meeting ended on a happy note with the combined 
staffs agreeing to the preparation of a directive for consideration by 
the President and Prime Minister. The latter had strong doubts that one 
man could effectively command such widely scattered forces as might be 
in the Pacific and offered a counter-proposal that each service choose 
its own commander and report to a Supreme War Council in Washington.^
Lord Beaverbrook, Churchill's production minister, favored the unity 
proposal and quietly suggested to Hopkins that he, Hopkins, discuss the 
details with Churchill. The result was a private discussion arranged by 
Hopkins between Marshall and Churchill, whereupon Churchill sunimoned his 
Chiefs of Staff for study of the proposal. On December 28, he impressed 
the British War Cabinet with the urgency of this decision in the eyes of 
the President and told them that "General Marshall visited me at my 
request and pleaded the case with great conviction."2 Later in the day, 
Churchill strongly endorsed the proposal.
The idea of a Supreme Commander in the field was followed by the 
conception of unity of staff for direction of the entire war^effort. The 
British had indicated early in the discussions their willingness to
^Hull suggested this procedure when he presented the draft of 
the Declaration of the United Nations to Roosevelt and Churchill. This 
may be the source of Churchill's idea.
Zchurchill, III, p. 674.
64
having a single council sitting in Washington. Their original idea had 
been to have special appointees represent the London-based Chiefs of 
Staff. Since Marshall was opposed to additional levels of authority 
between service chiefs and political heads, he recommended delay in 
establishing "some sort of council." This time, it was the United States 
Navy in the person of Chief of Operations, Admiral King, who insisted on 
firm action now. King's reasoning was that unity of command in the 
Pacific demanded agreement by both the Americans and the British on the 
control organization. The result was that the conference accepted a 
British proposal for stationing in Washington a Joint Staff Mission to 
represent the British Chiefs of Staff in regular meetings with their 
American counterparts. Thus, the military representatives established 
the committee called the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which directed Anglo- 
American strategy until the war's end. This entity became a major means, 
of resolving strong strategic differences which later arose between the 
British and American military planners. Its formation had additional 
impact on the war effort in that it forced the establishment of a formal 
American Joint Chiefs of Staff as the President's direct advisory group. 
Secretary Stimson was especially glad to see that turn of events, for in 
his view "this formal organization of the staffs had . . .  a most salutary 
effect on the President's weakness for snap decisions.
With the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allies 
provided central management for war planning and operation, but a similar 
management function for supply and logistics was also needed if efficient
^Stimson and Bundy, p. 414.
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production was to be properly coordinated with operational needs. The 
machinery selected took the form of the Munitions Assignment Board, which 
came under the purview of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but which had 
offices in both Washington and London. For months before the Arcadia 
conference the British had been seriously alarmed over American failure 
to decide on an orderly method of allocating munitions to the military 
services of the United States and the Associated Powers. They were just 
as concerned over the delay in developing an industrial program that would 
insure the production needed for victory. As Churchill's Minister of 
Production, Lord Beaverbrook favored a committee under Hopkins to handle 
all problems of production - "a Supreme Command in supplies as well as in 
strategy."^ As early as August 1941, Marshall and Stark, also much 
concerned, had tried without success to place the allocation of military 
material under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the attack on pearl 
Harbor, the President attempted to solve the problem by appointing 
Hopkins, Marshall, and Stark as members of a Strategic Munitions Board 
to establish an appropriate program for allocating munitions to the United 
States and to countries receiving defense aid. But they had held no formal 
meetings before the Arcadia Conference and seem never to have met there­
after.2
Allocation of supplies is as vital to carrying out grand strategy 
as is the deployment of men and machines. Therefore, _th Allies were
^Sherwood, p. 470.
^Richard M- Leighton, and Robert W. Coakley, The United States 
Army in World War II, The War Department; Global Logistics and Strategy 
1940-1943 (Washington; Department of the Army, 1955), pp. 247-248.
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anxious to achieve some manageable procedure. Negotiations took place 
at both political and military levels of authority during the conference. 
Discussions were heated and for a time it appeared that agreement might 
not be reached.
The British had arrived in Washington with fairly definite ideas 
about Anglo-American cooperation in the field of production and supply, 
and they had an elaborate organizational plan for putting their ideas into 
practice. However, the sharp disagreement experienced prior to the final 
decision in favor of a Combined Chiefs of Sraff Committee caused the 
visitors to proceed slowly when the inatter of production allocation came 
up for discussion. Furthermore, the British staff recognized the heavy 
administrative burden their original plan might place on any acceptable 
combined body. Therefore, General Macready of the British staff proposed 
an alternate plan. He and his opposite number on the United States staff. 
General Moore, had already agreed on the primary elements of the suggestion. 
The plan proposed by these two men called for pooling British and American 
production, which would then be divided in bulk between two Allocation 
Committees, one located in London and one in Washington, each serving a 
group of countries.
That sharp differences ensued is understandable, for such a system 
as proposed would essentially divide the world into two spheres of in­
fluence, with the United States and Great Britain each supporting the 
needs of the Allies for whom respectively they had accepted responsibility. 
The word "proteges" was used to describe the sponsored Allies. The
United States proteges would include Latin American countries and China, 
and the British proteges would include France and other countries of
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continental Europe, Turkey, the Arab states, and the British Dominions 
and colonies. Decisions affecting the distribution of supplies as 
between one Ally and another, or one neutral and another, might assume 
considerable diplomatic significance. Under a divided source of supply, 
individual smaller nations would tend to become firmly oriented 
(politically as well as practical) toward the nation which was the source 
of supply. This offered the potential of forming a British sphere of 
influence through the flow of United States produced supplies. Therefore, 
"few propositions could have been devised that would more quickly arouse 
American suspicions that the British were planning to use United States 
supplies to serve purely national interests.Marshall insisted that 
control would be exercised only by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and from 
Washington. He felt that "nothing but confusion would follow from trying 
to create duplicate b o d i e s . F i e l d  Marshall Sir John Dill, Chief of the 
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, agreed with Marshall, but 
pointed out that a decision had to be made on some system for control 
of supply and allocation of war material. He suggested, therefore, that 
the Americans join the British Staff in signing a draft resolution to the 
effect that finished war material should be allocated in accordance with 
strategic needs and that control of both London and Washington Allocation 
Committees would rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Marshall agreed, 
and the other American staff members reluctantly joined him in signing
Ipogue, p. 286.
2j. M. A. Gwyer, History of the Second World War, Grand Strategy. 
Vol. Ill (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), p. 397.
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the resolution. This resolution ended the military side of the nego­
tiations and the results were submitted to the President and the Prime 
Minister.
Simultaneously with the discussions conducted by the Chiefs of
Staff, Hopkins and Beaverbrook were also considering the problems of
production and its allocation. Early in the conference sessions, Hopkins
had recommended a two man Board for the task of allocating war materials.^
He envisioned one American and one British representative. Such a board
would be at the highest level of authority. Churchill was inclined to
agree with this approach when he discussed it with his staff. His
immediate purpose was assurance that the Americans would share fairly 
2with the British. Beaverbrook favored a supreme command over supplies 
as well as strategy. The ideas merged toward the end of political 
deliberations in a proposal which Roosevelt handed Marshall only a few 
minutes before British and American representatives filed into the 
President's White House Office for the last meeting of the conference.
The proposal would set up boards under Hopkins and Beaverbrook independent
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, one in London and one in Washington. With
only Hopkins and Roosevelt present, Marshall reiterated his views that the 
military must control military supplies and that if this view were not 
accepted, "he could not continue to assume responsibilities of Chief of 
Staff."3 Hopkins agreed with Marshall to the extent that "if the
Ipogue, p. 286. 
^Gwyer, p. 397. 
^Sherwood, p. 472.
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organization were not established as Marshall said it should be, he 
could not assume responsibility in it either.
In the conference with Churchill and his staff which followed, 
the President presented the General's case, and both Marshall and Hopkins 
repeated their arguments. When Churchill and Beaverbrook debated the 
question, pointing to the possibility of disagreements, Hopkins suggested 
that in case of disputes, appeal could be made to the President and Prime 
Minister. With some reluctance, Churchill agreed to try the arrangement 
for a month, and Roosevelt quickly closed the bargain with "We shall call 
it a preliminary agreement and try it out that way."2 Although far from 
perfect, this was the best solution circumstances would allow, and the
arrangement continued in force with very little alteration until the end
of the war. Sherwood's summation concerning the Munitions Boards is 
appropriate: "The disputes which resulted produced minor irritations,
but no serious discord. Hopkins usually moved in on these and his 
decision was accepted as final.
The Arcadia conference was a success for all participants. 
Churchill could look with satisfaction on the accomplishments achieved. 
His primary objective in asking for the meeting, reaffirmation of a 
Germany first strategy, had been met. Further, he had little reason to 
doubt that, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in existence, 





and use it essentially in such a manner as the Minister of Defense might 
wish. Therefore, progress toward Churchill's broad goal of victory had 
been advanced.
The President was also in a position to view with satisfaction
the Arcadia results. Not only did the United States now officially share
a common cause with twenty-five other nations of the world, but one of 
these, Russia, might well be a key to complete success in effecting postr 
war peace efforts. It was also evident, in the light of British agreement 
to Washington control of war production, that Roosevelt had the final word 
and Washington was the headquarters for the joint war effort. As a result, 
he was almost assured of Great Britain's support in his post-war hopes. 
Surely, these three nations could police the world until such time as a 
truly competent international body could be established to maintain world 
peace.
Finally, the military leaders on both sides could join their 
political leaders in a feeling of satisfaction following the conference. 
They were essentially in agreement on immediate strategy. Furthermore, 
the American proposal for unity in command had found agreement, and a means
for central strategic management of the war had been designed. Leaders
from both nations very likely could forecast differences in opinion before 
many months elapsed. But as the conference ended, a sense of solid 
purpose in a common endeavor was evident, and a valuable step toward 
even closer cooperation had been taken.
CHAPTER V
THE SECOND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE:
STRATEGIC DIVERSION - NORTH AFRICA
Within a month after the British visitors had returned home from 
the Arcadia conference, military developments in Europe and the Far East 
put all the hard-won agreements under severe strain. The Japanese war 
machine was moving with such speed and confidence that both nations 
developed concern for the lines of communication to Australia and New 
Zealand, not to mention the Philippines and Singapore. The reinforced 
Germans in North Africa were- delivering staggering blows to the British 
forces there. The American military establishment was now overwhelmed 
with money, men, and authority to build an army, navy, aqd air force, but 
time was at a premium and production was still insufficient to meet the 
many needs. In Britain, Churchill was criticized for a variety of things, 
including his lengthy stay at the Arcadia meetings. About the only source 
of good news was the Russian Front where the Red Army was making counter­
attacks .
This chapter will be devoted, to a consideration of the American 
effort to offset the above conditions, and to expedite the application of 
its force as soon as^ and in the most direct'way possible against Germany. 
Problems arose primarily because the strategy advocated by the Americans 
in this effort was in almost direct opposition to that argued by Churchill 
and staff. Therefore, the cooperation pledged at the Arcadia conference
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received early testing. The rationale for decisions made is also of 
special interest to us at this time. Although these decisions were 
predominantly military and pertained to strategy, the deciding factors 
were political, and the strain caused by these decisions extended through­
out the Anglo-American staffs for the remainder of the war.
Hitler's attack on Russia in mid-1941 had taken some of the
pressure' off Britain, insofar as danger of invasion was concerned.
However, Russia exerted a steadily increasing pressure on both Britain
and the United States to furnish supplies in kind and quantity not
readily available. Both Roosevelt and Churchill concurred in support of
the Russian demands to the extent possible. Although there are indications
that Churchill retained some reservations concerning lasting British unity
with Stalin, heimade it clear that Britain would support Russia against
the Nazi attack.
Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our 
aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe . . .
That is our policy and our declaration. It follows, therefore, 
that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the 
Russian people.^
Roosevelt could not at the time publicly make such a blanket offer, 
because his nation might not agree. However, he used his authority and 
influence in every way possible to comply with Russian demands on United 
States production, and eventually was able to bring Russia under the 
terms of the Lend-Lease Act.% In the early months of 1942, when Russia
^Churchill, III, p. 372.
2a  detailed discussion of decisions for aid to Russia is contained 
in the Twentieth Century Fund Series: (Harold Stein Ed., American Civil
Military Decisions (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 99- 
140.
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was the sole successful challenger to German force, the President gave 
top priority to assistance to Russia even at the expense of equipping 
his own armed forces and of aid to Britain. Thus, it is certain that 
both these national leaders were in accord concerning the need and desire 
to support the USSR. In spite of this earnest effort, however, the 
combination of German U-boat attacks on shipping, and demands for defense 
against Japan combined to reduce the amount of materials actually de­
livered to Russia. Hence, as Russian forces were fighting with backs 
toward the Soviet capital, Stalin was insultingly vocal in his demands 
for a Second Front.
The Red dictator's attitude was often cause for disgust and 
chagrin on the part of Roosevelt and Churchill. For although he had 
given lip service adherence to the Atlantic Charter, and had authorized 
the signing of the Declaration of the United Nations, his conversation 
with Anthony Eden during the letter's mission to Moscow in December,
1941, lacked the elements of true cooperation. At that time he dis­
closed his ambitions concerning the post-war settlement. He told :den 
he would demand: ". . .' dismemberment of Germany; extension of the
Russian boundary 150 miles into Poland; a Soviet hegemony in the Baltic 
and B a l k ans.Roosevelt and. Churchill disagreed in the way these Russian 
political demands should be handled. Churchill wanted documented Russian 
agreement on such things as disputed national boundaries and extent of 
"Soviet hegemony" while Russia was on the defensive, dependent upon 
Western aid, and anxious for the Second Front. The Prime Minister felt
^Brandon, p. 74.
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that Stalin would agree to a more reasonable course of action while he 
was dependent upon the British and Americans for supplies. Roosevelt, 
on the other hand, insisted that territorial type questions be delayed 
until peace deliberations. The President genuinely wished for nations to 
comply with the terms of the Atlantic Charter, whereas, Churchill had no 
compunctions about making "deals" if they would lead to victory. In 
spite of disagreement about post-war methodology, however, both were 
anxious and eager to provide a Second Front or its equivalent. But the 
place and procedure for launching it were in question as the two nations 
wrestled with their several problems.
The American war planners and Departmental Secretaries also desired 
early action in the direction of a Second Front. Their reasons were justi­
fiably military in nature. Stimsqn felt " . . .  that the absence of such 
a (detailed operational) plan was a serious weakness; without it there 
could be no firm commitment that could prevent a series of diversionary 
shipments of troops and supplies to other areas more immediately threatened."^ 
At the White House, Stimson advocated " . . .  sending an overwhelming force 
to the British Isles and threatening an attack through France."2 Soon 
after this expression, his view was confirmed by Chief of War Plans 
Division, Brigadier General Eisenhower, who said:
We've got to go to Europe and fight - and we've got to quit wasting 
resources all over the world - and still worse - wasting time. If 
we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma; 
we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed 
by a land attack as soon as possible.3
^Stimson and Bundy, pp. 415-416.
^Stimson Diary, March 5, 1942, as cited by Stimson and Bundy, p. 416.
3pogue, p. 304.
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Such was the position taken by all the President's advisers.
Their advice was soon supported by Marshall who presented a plan to the 
President on April 1, 1942. The latter approved it for immediate presen­
tation to the British in London by Marshall and Hopkins. Known in American 
circles as the Marshall memorandum, this plan became the basis for the
much discussed cross-Channel operation, thereafter ̂advocated by the 
Americans. Proposed as the. first major offensive by the United States 
and Great Britain, the operation was to begin in April, 1943, and would 
involve the landing of sizeable forces in France. The Americans chose 
France as the locale for initiating the first United States field action 
against Hitler because of the space thus provided for full development of 
Anglo-American combined land and air resources. Further, action there 
would provide a solid Second Front in support of the beleaguered Russians. 
The British were " . . .  relieved by the evident strong American intention 
to intervene in Europe, and to give the main priority to the defeat of 
Hitler. This had always been the foundation of our strategic thought."^
As an "emergency" action only, the American proposal also included 
an alternative, greatly reduced, plan that if initiated at all would take 
place in late summer or autumn of 1942. Although the Americans offered 
the smaller scale plan, only for use in the event Russia could not hold 
out, there were additional reasons for its having been designed. One was 
to provide battle experience for Americans in preparation for the big 
event in 1943. Another was to insure that, if there was to be combined 
action anywhere in 1942, it would be in a theater of the main strike and
^Churchill, III, p. 316.
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diversion of forces thus would be avoided. The British Chiefs of Staff 
agreed with the outlines for cross-Channel action in 1943, but they 
warned that 1942 was another matter, which would have to be governed by 
developments in R u s s i a . B o t h  Churchill and Alanbrooke withheld ex­
pression of their true feelings.% The result was that Marshall and 
Hopkins returned to the United States thinking the British were in com­
plete agreement. The evident misunderstanding was most unfortunate for 
the reason given by Lord Ismay: " . . .  when we had to tell them . . .
that we were absolutely opposed to it, they felt we had broken faith with 
them."3 But an even more troublesome result was Roosevelt's implied 
pledge to Stalin that a Second Front would be created in Europe in 1942.^
One reason for this pledge stemmed from Roosevelt's principal 
wartime objective: to obtain active Soviet participation in the United
Nations organization after the war was won.^ The President had the utmost 
confidence in his capacity to charm Stalin out of his design for Russian 
expansion and World Communism. Therefore, he more than ever wanted to 
provide Stalin with timely and positive American support. In this way,
Ipogue, p. 318.
^Alanbrooke was not impressed with the strategy involved and felt 
Marshall's main purpose in advocating the 1942 plan was to fit political 
opinion (at home) and the desire to help Russia. (Arthur Bryant, Turn 
of the Tide (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 288-299.
^Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay (New York: The




some sense of appreciation by Stalin might foster a personal relationship, 
which would permit the charm to work. George Kennan has expressed dis­
appointment at Roosevelt's attitude by saying:
. . . FDR's evident conviction that Stalin, while perhaps a 
somewhat difficult customer, was only, after all, a person like 
any other person; that . . .  we hadn't been able to get along
with him . . . (because) we had never really had anyone with the
proper personality and the proper qualities of sympathy and 
imagination to deal with him, . . . that if only he could be
exposed to the persuasive charm of someone like FDR himself,
ideological preconceptions would melt and Russia's cooperation 
with the West could be easily arranged. For these assumptions,
there were no grounds whatever; and they were of a puerility
that was unworthy of a statesman of FDR's stature.^
Kennan's conviction notwithstanding, Roosevelt certainly implied 
a commitment to Stalin at a time when Churchill's emissary. Admiral 
Mountbatten, was enroute to the United States for the^express—purpose of 
insisting that any 1942 cross-Channel attack would be a mistake. A prior 
message to Roosevelt from Churchill announced Mountbatten's visit and 
forecast difficulties in the 1942 cross-Channel plans. In closing his 
message to Roosevelt, Churchill said, "We must never let Gymnast (a plan 
for invading North Africa) pass from our minds."2 The Prime Minister then 
secured his position with the British War, Cabinet by obtaining their firm 
refusal to commit England to the controversial 1942 cross-Channel action.
In this way, when Molotov stopped in London enroute to Russia, after his
visit with the President, Churchill was able to inform the Russian 
Foreign Minister that the British were definitely not committed to the
^George Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961), p. 355.
^Churchill, IV, p. 340.
78
kind of Second Front implied by Roosevelt. Such deliberate action by 
one Ally to forestall the intentions of another would have overtaxed to 
the breaking point the patience of smaller men.
Having refused to support what he considered to be an unwise 
American proposal for 1942 cross-Channel action, Churchill was anxious 
to explain his position to the President. Although Mountbatten had al­
ready explained all the ramifications of such an attack and why the 
British were reluctant to proceed with it, the Prime Minister was never 
one to leave vital actions unresolved. Just as Marshal'l'"a'hd~Stimson were 
eager to establish a plan for early action, so did Churchill and his staff 
want combined action in 1942. However, they wished to take such action 
where it would stand the greatest chance of success and at the same time 
possibly support an action already in progress.^ This rationale brought 
the Prime Minister on his second journey to Washington in mid-June 1942.
It is notable that, when Mountbatten was talking to Roosevelt and 
Hopkins, no points pertaining to professional military planning seem to 
have been raised. Certainly, there were no military planners present to 
pose appropriate questions.2 The same procedure appears to have been 
followed when Churchill put in his appearance in late June 1942. He 
proceeded immediately to Hyde Park, where he met with Roosevelt and 
Harry Hopkins. The British Chiefs of Staff, who had accompanied the 
Prime Minister to the United States, were routed to Washington to confer
^Churchill, III, pp. 374-384.
^Wedemeyer, p . 139.
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with the American Chiefs. As an example of the existing divergence in 
opinion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were deciding against a Northwest 
Africa invasion even as Churchill was praising its possibilities at Hyde 
Park. The Combined Staff recommendation was against "any other periph­
eral operation that would divert attention from Bolero (the build up 
for cross-Channel in 1943). Any plan, however, would be preferable 
to undertaking Gymnast, especially from the standpoint of dispersing base 
organization, lines of sea communications, and air strength.However, 
what the Combined Chiefs of Staff had to say never was presented at Hyde 
Park. Churchill's account supports the conclusion that he had long since 
ceased to consider the American 1942 action as the contingency or desper­
ation measure it always had been. Rather, in his mir^,--AmeTl~cans con­
sidered what originally had been an emergency plan, as now being a firm 
commitment. But he was convinced of the plan's weakness for reasons he
presented as questions: " . . .  Who is the officer prepared to command
2the enterprise? What British forces and assistance are required?"
While these questions were being asked, there were no professional 
soldiers, British or American, present. Therefore, there was nobody 
present qualified to answer properly the Prime Minister's expressions of 
doubt. In reality, there may have been valid answers for the posed 
rhetorical questions. Several writers have recorded well-documented
^Wedemeyer, p . 148,
2pogue, p. 330.
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counter-arguments to the Prime Minister's objections.^ However, at the 
time, and under the circumstances, he was 'very effective in bringing 
Roosevelt around to his point of view. American military leaders viewed 
the Prime Minister's performance as a deliberate stratagem to shake the 
confidence of the American political leaders in their military staff, 
since he used only military reasons to support his argument. No mention 
was made of political or economic objectives as he built his case. In 
any event, although he may have embittered some American military men, 
Churchill very effectively accomplished his purpose at the time.
Some accounts give Churchill full credit for winning Roosevelt 
over to the North African course of action. Others refer to Stimson's 
belief that the President always was attracted to a North African 
campaign.2 The latter appears to be more nearly accurate when con­
sideration is given to the extended activity in the French African Empire 
by Robert Murphy of the State Department. When the French-German 
armistice had been signed in June, 1939, Hitler had agreed that the 
French-African empire would not be occupied by German troops. Rather, 
it would be semi-independent. Murphy has reported that Roosevelt was 
intrigued by this situation and " . . .  believed that North Africa was 
the most likely place where French tr?ops might be brought back into the 
was against Nazi Germany."3 As a result, from September, 1940, until the
^General Wedemeyer is one of these. He ". . . ventures a long be­
lated reply", in his Wedemeyer Reports, 145-145. Also see Samuel Eliot 
Morison, Strategy and Compromise (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1958), 
pp. 36-45.
2". . .it was the President's great secret baby." (Stimson and 
Bundy, p. 425).
^Robert Murpay, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York; Doubleday and 
CO., Inc., 1964), pp. 68-69.
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fall of 1942, Murphy was on the spot in either Africa, Vichy France, or 
the Iberian Peninsula. He kept the President fully informed concerning 
French-African activities and was a chief architect of the French North 
African collaboration throughout the period of the North African campaign. 
Thus, "French African policy of the United States Government became the 
President's personal policy. He initiated it, he kept it going, and he 
resisted pressures against it.
In addition to such factors as discussed above, immediate events 
also had a bearing favorable to Churchill in gaining Roosevelt's, as well 
as Marshall's softening toward North Africa. 'At the height of their 
argument, Tobruk fell. The necessity for maintaining their sea lanes and 
communications with empire, and the importance of the Middle East to the 
success of such an effort was understandably uppermost in the minds of 
the British. Therefore, with the loss of Tobruk to the Germans, talks on 
strategy had to give way to the more urgent needs of filling the gaps in 
the Middle East force. Churchill's already well-stated opposition to the 
1942 cross-Channel venture was now bolstered, and he ". . . poured out 
his matchless prose . . .  in favor of Gymnast as a means of relieving the 
crisis in,the Mediterranean.However, regardless of the strong British 
arguments and the sympathetic Presidential and military support of British 
forces then fighting in Africa, there was no actual revision at that time 




The immediate though tentative decision, which came from these 
meetings, was that the build-up of forces in England would continue in 
accordance with plans for the 1943 cross-Channel operation, and that a 
firm decision regarding the 1942 action would be made following a review 
not later than September, 1942.  ̂ However, Churchill had sown the seed of 
the North African idea during that June visit, and in spite of American 
strategic arguments to the contrary, his contentions carried the day.
The final decision was made in July after Roosevelt sent Marshall, King, 
and Hopkins to London ". . . to . . . come to some^^inal^'girëêmënt with 
the British."2
The President arranged for this presidential representative contact 
with Churchill in July when he saw how serious was the disagreement be­
tween the British and American military leaders. Most indications were 
that the British would not agree to a 1942 cross-Channel attack. Knowing 
this, and having programmed equipment and troops for the 1942 possibility, 
Marshall and King began to consider seriously diverting the primary 
United States military effort to the Pacific. Marshall later said he was 
bluffing in order to prod the British into action. But King was serious 
and consistently advocated action in the Pacific theater in every way 
open to him.
Marshall advised the President by memorandum in early July that 
the United States Staff was considering a shift in favor of the Pacific 
alternative:
^Stimson and Bundy, p. 424.
2Pogue, p, 341,
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If the United States is to engage in any other operation than 
forceful, unswerving adherence to Bolero (build-up for cross- 
Channel invasion) plans, we are definitely of the opinion that 
we should turn to the Pacific and strike decisively against 
Japan; in other words, assume a defensive attitude against 
Germany, except for air operations; and use all available 
means in the Pacific.1
When pressed by the President for a full statement of the Pacific 
alternative, the service chiefs admitted that details were incomplete and 
that the proposed alternative would not improve the strategic situation. 
However, Stimson justified the desirability of the threat contained in 
Marshall's memorandum, as being "absolutely essential̂ ..--̂ ---7~rf‘~we ex­
pected to get through the hides of the B r i t i s h .
The President may have agreed that drastic statements might be 
necessary to move the British staff. However, he was well aware that 
leaving Britain in the lurch would not further his nation's cause. 
Therefore, he firmly rejected the Pacific idea and indicated that the 
direction of primary military effort must remain toward Germany. Further, 
he refused to take part in arbitrary threats during discussions with the 
British.
In preparation for the journey to England, Hopkins made notes of 
Roosevelt's thoughts concerning the action to which the United States 
should agree. These notes were the basis for the, final orders the party 
took with them to England. The President wanted very much to execute 
the plan for a 1942 cross-Channel invasion of France. "Such an operation
Ipogue, p. 340.
^Stimson Diary, July 15, 1942, as cited by Stimson and Bundy,
p. 425.
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would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning'point
which would save Russia this year.^ However, if investigation of
governing factors revealed insufficient support for the plan and the
British definitely refused to agree to it, "I want you to . . . determine
2upon another place for United States troops to fight in 1942." That 
United States ground forces must fight German forces somewhere in 1942 
was uppermost in Roosevelt's mind for political reasons. He would 
certainly gain no respect from Stalin if he permitted nearly a year to 
pass with no worthwhile action to relieve German pressure against Russia. 
Furthermore, an off year national election was scheduled for November, 
and his own people would be highly critical of inaction against the enemy. 
His military staff had already demonstrated the need for a firm program 
of action against whicn to prepare. Finally, he was obligated to early 
initiation of the British comradeship-in-arms ; an equivalent to the al­
ready successful collaboration in plans and supply.
The President recognized the several pressures upon Churchill which 
mitigated against a decision for the strike against Germany. The period 
of decision was indeed trying on the Prime Minister's patience., for when 
the latter returned home from the June, 1942 meetings, he faced serious 
domestic political problems. Following the military disasters in Libya, 
the making of a revolt in the House of Commons developed, and Churchill's 
government faced another vote of censure. Even though he was supported 




in committing large bodies of British force to any "sacrifice" operation, 
which he feared the 1942 cross-Channel action to be. His tenuous 
political situation demanded a victory. Further, his enthusiastic 
optimism, as a result of the United States entry into the war demanded 
that any initial Anglo-American military enterprise be an overwhelming 
success. Hence, when these points were added to the course of military 
action already advocated by the British Chiefs of Staff, the Prime 
Minister had little choice other than to refuse Marshall's plea for 
1942 cross-Channel action.
Prior to the American party's arrival. Field Marshall Dill, who 
by this time was the senior representative of the British Chiefs of Staff 
on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington, advised 
Alanbrooke, Chief of the British Imperial Staff, that Marshall felt the 
British had provided no real drive behind the European project. Dill 
suggested that the British must in some way show their determination to 
defeat the Germans. Such warnings were of little value, however, for the 
British were already certain they faced a divided delegation. "Hopkins 
is for operating in Africa, Marshall wants to operate in Europe, and King 
is determined to stick to the Pacific," Alanbrooke wrote even before the 
party arrived.^ Furthermore, Roosevelt had already let it be known that 
American forces had to be in action somewhere before the Year's end. 
Therefore, if the British stood firm against the 1942 cross-Channel attack, 
the Americans would accede to British designs for an invasion of North 
Africa.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p . 341,
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In accordance tîlth the President's request, Marshall made certain 
of the views of His,representatives in London before talking either to 
the Prime Minister or to the British Staff. Eisenhower and his associated 
were not unanimous in predicting success for the cross-Channel operation, 
but they thought an operation to seize the Cotentin Peninsula (of which 
the Cherbourg Peninsula is a part) had possibilities. They felt it might 
be held as a bridgehead on the continent until the larger 1943 action 
could be mounted.^ Since such an operation would have as its objective a 
"permanent" lodgment on the Continent, which Churchill insisted upon, 
there was momentary optimism among the Americans that their Ally might 
accept that part of the 1942 proposal. The optimism was short lived, 
however, for the British Chiefs of Staff believed "maintaining a lodgment" 
would be impossible. Alanbrooke recalled that "I had to convince them 
that there was no hope of such a bridgehead surviving the winter."2 Hence, 
the impasse remained.
Marshall made a final plea in order to salvage his main goal of- 
the large 1943 landing in France. For without this as a planning 
objective, he would be faced again with all the pressures for diversion 
of forces and material he had experienced for the previous year. The 
Prime Minister did not himself agree with Marshall's plan, but he brought 
the proposal before a formal meeting of the War Cabinet, and unanimously 
the members voted down any cross-Channel operation for 1942. Realizing 
" . . .  that a North African invasion was the only operation that would
1Sherwood, p. 608.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 342.
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have the full support of both the President and the Prime Minister,"^ 
Marshall and King began plans for Gymnast, rechristened Torch. Hopkins 
quickly advised Roosevelt that the North African campaign would be the 
American Staff's choice of alternatives and urged the President to set a 
date for mounting the attack not later than October 30, 1942. He said, 
"What I fear most is that if we do not now make a firm decision on 
Gymnast and fix a reasonably early date, there may be procrastinations 
and delay."2 The suspense date may well have had another stimulus, for 
the election previously mentioned took place the first week in November.
In any event, Roosevelt complied with Hopkins' suggestion and told 
Churchill of his delight "that the decision had been made and that orders 
were now full speed a h e a d . T h e r e  were further United States Staff 
attempts to change the President's mind about the North African campaign. 
Moreover, disagreement between British and American staffs over the time 
and place of landings in North Africa was cause for vast confusion and 
uncertainty during the month of August. However, the President's original 
decision was final, and he made it plain that he would tolerate no un­
necessary delay in mounting the campaign. This is evident by his asking 
the Gombined Chiefs of Staff to tell him on August 4 the earliest date 




^Churchill, IV, p. 451.
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During the few months covered by this chapter, the Anglo-American 
leaders moved from the stage of declarations and agreements to the stage 
of action and adjustment - adjustment to each other as well as adjustment 
in those earlier agreements. The Arcadia meetings had concluded with 
general consensus on the strategy for dealing with Germany and supporting 
Russia. However, Roosevelt's eagerness to please Stalin by precipitately 
implying a Second Front in 1942 might well have alienated Churchill, were 
the latter not determined to use all possible American help in achieving 
his goal of victory. As events developed, Churchill used the Russian 
trap, which Roosevelt had set for himself, to force 1942 American military 
action in the area desired by the British. If Roosevelt's demand for 
action in 1942 was to have substance, the Prime Minister was quick in 
pointing to the locale for such action - North Africa. In the eyes of 
the President's military staff, the North African campaign was sadly 
deficient as an aid to Stalin; would do little to hasten Germany's defeat; 
and promised to delay interminably victory-producing action in the 
Pacific. It was fairly obvious that Allied differences in strategy would 
surely arise again: However, with the decision made, even the American
Staff could agree with their commander-in-chief in his statement to 
Churchill following the decision for Torch: " . . .  the past week
represented a turning point in the whole war and . . . now we are on 
our way shoulder to shoulder.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 347.
CHAPTER VI
MIDWAR CONFERENCES : THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE
General Marshall remarked in one instance that in war time, 
political necessity demands at least one especially important military 
move every year.^ Operation Torch was the 1942 move. The action was 
clearly successful, and just as the American Chiefs of Staff had pre­
dicted, once combined force was committed to the Mediterranean area, 
the British pressed for its continuation there as part of their original 
strategy for defeating Germany. The Americans stoutly resisted further 
build up in force for expansion of action into southern Europe and 
pressed instead for a massive cross-Channel invasion of France at the 
earliest possible date. To pursue both courses of action simultaneously 
was impossible. The existing military forces simply were not adequate 
to support both of these theaters of action.
Strong differences in strategic opinion between British and 
American military leaders continued as the source of their major problems 
in cooperation throughout 1943. These differences sometimes attained 
such proportions that only through summit conferences could agreement and 
final decision be reached in a timely manner.
^Marshall mentioned this as a lesson he learned in 1942, following 
the presidential decision to invade North Africa. (Samuel Eliot Morison, 
American Contributions to the Strategy of World War II (London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), p. 23).
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Discussion of how such strategic policy evolved and the factors 
involved in achieving the necessary cooperation are the objectives of 
this chapter. Some of the decisions reached at Casablanca are pertinent 
to our study and are first in the order of discussion. It will then be 
necessary to move through this midwar period to several succeeding 
conferences before firm dates are agreed and plans are approved for the 
much discussed cross-Channel invasion or Second Front.
After Casablanca, the Trident conference was held in Washington 
during May 1943 and was immediately followed by -Churchill's and General 
Marshall's visit to Eisenhower's North African Headquarters. Within two 
months from that visit, Quebec was the host city for the Quadrant delib­
erations. Finally, after some indecision and diversionary planning, 
which threatened to negate decisions made at Quadrant, a firm course of 
action was decided at Teheran, when Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin 
conferred in person for the first time.
Although agreement on military strategy was the main Anglo- 
American objective of these midwar conferences, progress toward the 
realization of respective national goals was apparent, and political 
motivation began to emerge with increased clarity. The latter was 
expected, of course, for the chiefs of the two collaborating nations 
were masters in the art of politics, and they had political goals which 
were dependent upon the success of military action.
By the time a date was set for Overlord, as the 1944 cross- 
Channel operation was called, plans for achieving respective national 
goals became clearer to the President and the Prime Minister. The taste
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of victory in North Africa and its promise in Italy enabled the Prime 
Minister to think more clearly of where rather than how the final 
victory could best be achieved. His sense of history and his bent 
toward the traditional European balance of power came into play. The 
President, on the other hand, became more and more inflexibly convinced 
that the course of wisdom was away from power politics. His mind was on 
international cooperation, with the Big Three (England, the United States, 
and Russia) policing the world immediately after the cessation of 
hostilities. He wished to include China as well, if she could be brought 
to sufficient status in power and prestige.
While political strategy was thus becoming more fixed, the military 
staffs of both nations were gradually moving from strategic divergence 
to agreement. Nevertheless, sharp differences and bitter argument 
between the military staffs of both the United States and Britain con­
tinued. Still, as victory became more certain, the British inclination 
to mount small military actions along the European periphery diminished. 
Since the Americans had always viewed with alarm this probing or 
pecking type of military action, the lessening in British advocacy of 
such strategy reduced the strain on the joint military cooperation.
This change was considerably influenced by the ascendency of American 
forces. United States manpower and production grew by leaps and bounds 
while the British productive capacity had passed its peak.
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Casablanca; Expanded Mediterranean Action -
Sicily
Although Operation Torch was unpopular with American planners, 
from a tactical point of view it was certainly a success.^ This very 
success raised a question in global strategy which, by December 1942, 
demanded attention from the British and American partners. The question; 
Should operations in the Mediterranean now stop to enable the resumption
of a build-up of forces in the British Isles for a 1943 invasion of
/
France, or should operations in the Mediterranean continue with some 
ultimate objective of invading southern Europe? The answer given to 
this question would very largely determine the disposition of British and 
American forces in 1943. Recognizing the unsettled condition of Anglo- 
American fundamental war strategy and planning, Roosevelt suggested 
another meeting on the highest level, with Stalin participating.
Churchill was in solid agreement and, after Stalin advised his inability 
to leave Russia "even for a day,"^ Casablanca was decided upon as the 
meeting place.
The Prime Minister had no doubt concerning the correct course of 
Allied action. In November 1942 he had cabled the President that the 
"paramount task" before the United States and Great Britain was, first, 
to conquer North Africa and open the Mediterranean to military traffic, 
and, second, to use the bases on the African coast^Jito'^strike at the
^General Wedemeyer has called it ". . . a wasteful side show . . . 
but a grand success." (Wedemeyer, 170). As a dress rehearsal for an in­
vasion of Europe, the North African campaign was . . . profitable." 
(Donald W. Mitchell, "Victory in Tunis," Current History, IV (June 1943), 
p. 237).
^Churchill, IV, p. 666.
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underbelly of the Axis . . .  in the shortest t i m e . T h i s  remained 
Churchill's opinion in January 1943 and in his mind was the obvious 
immediate objective for consideration at Casablanca.
On the eve of the Casablanca conference the President's attitude 
on the critical issue of cross-Channel invasion of Prance versus con­
tinued Mediterranean operations was one of wait and see.^ He favored 
building up United States forces in both the United Kingdom and North 
Africa and postponing the choice for a while. Roosevelt had no particular 
aversion to Mediterranean ventures and, although he did not engage in 
military arguments with his advisers as did the Prime Minister, he was 
not prepared to commit himself, even to his staff, before the conference.
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff approached the meetings with­
out a clearly defined position but resolved not to give way to their 
British colleagues any more than necessary.3 Under these circumstances 
General Marshall could hardly bring about consensus among his people 
before the conference, but he felt obliged to wage a strong rear-guard 
action in defense of the cross-Channel invasion plan. He could thus 
serve notice to all that concentration of force for a major cross-Channel 
operation was still a cardinal objective in American strategic planning.
^Sherwood, p. 674.
^Matloff, p. 21.
^Wedemeyer expresses the American Staff dilemma ". . .we had no 
assurance that the President would support our choice of concentration, 
and, on the military level, we were without agreement among ourselves 
as how to convince the British of the danger of frittering away our 
combined resources on indecisive, limited operations." (Wedemeyer, 
p. 185).
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Whereas the Apiericans came to Casablanca with a small staff and 
with preparations incomplete, the British brought a full staff and care­
fully prepared plans and positions. "For every argument they advanced 
they were able to produce . . . plans and statistics worked out to the 
last detail.Further, at a meeting of the Brit...n party on the night 
prior to the beginning of official discussions, the Prime Minister out­
lined the course they should follow during conference deliberations:
They were not to hurry or try to force agreement, but to take 
plenty of time; there was to be full discussion and no impatience - 
'the dripping of water on a stone.' In the meantime he himself 
would pursue the same tactics with the President. He added that 
he would like to see agreement reached, not only to clear the 
North African shore and capture Sicily in 1943, but to recapture 
Burma and launch a preliminary invasion of France. Nothing less, 
he felt, would be worthy of two great Powers and their obligation 
to Russia.2
As British chairman, Alanbrooke followed the Prime Minister's 
advice and encouraged the fullest possible expression of everybody's 
opinion as the Combined Chiefs of Staff sought agreement. Marshall 
presented American arguments. In speaking to the conference, he con­
sidered the basic question as being the extent the Allied powers should 
adhere to the general concept of cross-Channel actionj^t^which all had 
given lip service) and the extent to which they could undertake diversions 
from it in the interest of helping Russia, improving the shipping sit­
uation, and maintaining the pressure against Germany and Japan. He felt 
that a decision for the "main plot" had to be made, for each diversion
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 439. 
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 445.
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from the primary plan siphoned off equipment and manpower and severely 
complicated production programs and troop mobilization. Marshall reviewed 
all the arguments the American staff had advanced since the spring of 1942 
and further expressed serious doubt that decisions to extend operations in 
the Mediterranean while at the same time concentrating forces in the 
British Isles, would permit any Pacific operations at all. His position 
was that any Mediterranean undertaking projected for 1943 should be 
weighed in terms of its effects on the already critical shipping situation, 
the build-up of forces in England, and its role in the overall planning, 
to include Pacific action.^
Admiral King's conference comments supported Marshall's argument
with reference to the Pacific. He cautioned against becoming so concerned
with European preparations that the Japanese might be able to consolidate
their newly won positions. In his view, merely maintaining pressure
against the Japanese was not enough. Rather, more resources should be
allotted to the Pacific area. King's attitude was that so long as the
British persisted in peripheral Mediterranean actions, why not divert
forces, including landing craft, to the Pacific where Americans were
2facing an aggressive Japan? The argument which ensued left a lasting
^See Minutes, 55th Meeting Combined Chiefs of Staff (hereafter 
referred to as CCS), 14 January 1943; and Minutes, 58th CCS, 16 January 
1943; as cited by Maurice Matloff, United States Army in World War II,
The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944 
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 21-22.
^Wedemeyer offers an analysis of King's rationale and motivation 
to look after American interests in the United States strategic sphere - 
the Pacific. (Wedemeyer, 181 and 187).
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impression on the British staff about Admiral King. Throughout his diary 
of this period, Alanbrooke attributes Anglo-American landing craft diffi­
culties to King's abiding interest in the Pacific war.^
In reply for the British Chiefs of Staff, Alanbrooke took the 
position to which he held throughout 1943: that the British and Americans
could not land on the continent in force until Germany definitely weakened. 
The British Chief of Staff.presented three telling points. First, less 
than half the required divisions could be made available for a cross- 
Channel operation, by mid-September 1943. Secondly, if preparations for 
that operation were made, no support could be given Russia during the 
summer of 1943. Thirdly, the best way to effect dispersal of German forces 
not only from France, but also from the Soviet front, was to threaten 
Germany everywhere in the Mediterranean, try to knock Italy out of the 
war, and try to bring Turkey in on the Allied side. He went on to advo­
cate an increase in British-American air attacks on Germany, but called 
for a continued build-up of forces in England in preparation for the 
invasion of the continent.^
The differences between the two staffs thus being__£learly pre­
sented, the first four days of the conference dealt with arguing the 
points of view and the effects particular actions might have on various 
theaters. Alanbrooke indicates a feeling of despair when, as late as the
^"I'm afraid that nothing we said had much effect in weaning King 
away from the Pacific. This is where his heart was, and the bulk of his 
Naval Forces. The European war was just a great nuisance that kept him 
from waging his Pacific war undisturbed." (Notes on My Life, VIII, 599, 
as cited in Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 446).
^See Minutes, 57th. Meeting CCS, 15 January 1943, as cited in 
Matloff, p. 23.
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fourth day, his staff had to present a new paper for discussion of the 
long-since-agreed basic strategic principle of defeating Germany first.
He had found that the American Joint Planners now "were wishing to defeat 
Japan f i r s t . S o m e w h a t  in desperation, Alanbrooke turned to Field 
Marshall Dill, who was the closest of British friends to General Marshall, 
for possible support. Dill assumed an optimistic attitude and suggested 
that much progress had already been made and pointed out that some compro­
mise on the few remaining differences would be mandatory. Since Dill had 
the confidence of Marshall, he was fairly well acquainted with the extent 
of compromise required. He told Alanbrooke that "you must come to some 
agreement with the Americans and . . . you cannot bring the unsolved 
problem up to the Prime Minister and the P r e s i d e n t . A t  this juncture 
in the conversation. Air Marshall Portal arrived with a proposal similar 
to Dill's suggestions. The result was that Dill discussed the tentative 
proposal with Marshall in private before the next meeti^g^— and_with minor 
alterations, the British proposed compromise was accepted as follows;
Operations in the Pacific and the Far East shall continue with the 
forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on 
Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readi­
ness for the full-scale offensive against Japan . . . as soon as 
Germany is defeated. These operations must be kept within such 
limits as will not, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 449.
^This event is described by Alanbrooke in Bryant, Turn of the Tide, 
pp. 449-450, where he "gave Dill credit for securing the agreement with 
the Americans on this memorable day."
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prejudice the capacity of the United Nations to take any opportunity 
that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.1
At about the same time Alanbrooke, through Dill's good offices, 
was reaching a stage of satisfactory progress with his American counter­
part, Churchill was able to report to the British War Cabinet that "I am 
satisfied the President is strongly in favour of the Mediterranean being 
given prime place. He also seems increasingly inclined to Operation 
"Husky" (Sicily)."2 It appeared that the "dripping of water on a stone" 
was an effective procedure for the British.
Aside from strong arguments advanced by the British and the 
inclinations of the President and the Prime Minister, Marshall recognized 
certain other critical factors which cast doubt on the possibility of 
his 1943 cross-Channel hopes. Experience in recent^mphibious operations 
had caused Eisenhower to revise upward the requirements for landing craft 
in support of a cross-Channel effort. He also felt that more troops 
would be required than his plans had called for in 1942 before Operation 
Torch.3 Another seriously limiting factor recognized by Marshall and 
constantly emphasized by King, was the submarine menace and the delivery 
of supplies to Russia. The totals of Allied shipping losses for 1942 
were 1,494 ships and 7,446,204 gross tons.^ An immediate continuation of
^Bryant, 450. Chester Wilmot points out that the phrase "in the 
opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" gave the Americans free rein in 
deciding the scope of Pacific operations. Chester Wilmot, The Struggle 
for Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 121.
^Churchill, IV, p. 676.
^Minutes, Special Meeting Joint Chiefs of Staff and President, 
January 16, 1943, as cited by Matloff, p. 24.
^Churchill, IV, p. 879.
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action in the Mediterranean also offered advantages on the air power side, 
for with all the north coast of Africa and all of Sicily in Allied hands, 
air strikes against more distant German targets would be possible. Control 
of Sicily would offer additional advantages as well, such as the prospect 
of releasing 225 vessels for use in the Middle East and the Pacific.
In the end, therefore, Marshall yielded, but in so doing, he "made 
it clear that the United States Chiefs of Staff were accepting the 
Mediterranean operation only as an expedient action dictated by current 
circumstances."^ He still intended that the main effort against Germany 
would be across the Channel. By way of furthering this intention, he and 
King together may have established one other point with their British 
colleagues. This was to the effect that the Pacific action would continue 
in a dynamic manner, and any war equipment standing idle as it awaited 
some possible, though indefinite, use in Europe would be moved to the 
Pacific. In this way, the American Army and Navy Chiefs established a 
possible lever for balancing forces among diversionary efforts and those 
of primary importance. Concentration of force for the cross-Channel 
effort might thus be retrieved.
From a military point of view, the decision for continued action 
in the Mediterranean, with emphasis on Sicilian operations as the 
successor to North Africa, was the result of most importance to our 
study. However, from the political point of view and of significance to 
Roosevelt's long range goals, the President's announcement that
^Matloff, p. 25.
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unconditional surrender would be required of the Axis nations was the 
most important result of the conference. Advanced by Roosevelt as an 
apparent spur-of-the-mdment decision during a press conference near the 
end of the Casablanca deliberations, the "unconditional surrender" formula 
was interpreted by a number of observers as a unilateral Presidential 
decision. Churchill appeared to be surprised by the announcement but 
recovered immediately and gave the policy his full support. Neverthe­
less, there was considerable coimaent from public figures of both Britain 
and the United States concerning the wisdom of such a policy, and the 
President received unfair criticism for his so-called "impulsive" 
announcement. The Prime Minister has since revealed the existence of 
documentation which confirms prior discussion and decision regarding the 
policy before the President made his announcement.^
In spite of the issues raised by the unconditional surrender 
formula and the long debate as to its value or detriment to the progress 
of the war, the principle had important consequences for the coalition. 
Assuredly the announcement bolstered Russian spirits, for the Western 
Powers thus expressed uncompromising determination to wage a fight to the 
finish with Germany. More important to Roosevelt, however, was that 
implicit in this simple formula of resolute purpose was a notice to 
friend and foe alike that there would be no negotiated peace, no escape 
clauses were to be offered. As Churchill told the House of Commons in
^Churchill, IV, pp. 684-688. Sherwood also asserts that "this 
announcement of Unconditional Surrender was very deeply deliberated . . . 
(and the President) had his eyes wide open when he made it." (Sherwood, 
pp. 696-697).
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February 1944, "No such arguments will be admitted by us as were used by 
Germany after the last war, saying that they surrendered in consequence 
of President Wilson's Fourteen P o i n ts.Finally, the expression of such 
a firm purpose served to bind more closely the fortunes and actions of 
the two English speaking nations as they moved forward in a great 
collaboration begun essentially at the Atlantic Conference. Such a 
philosophy of purpose fitted well the agreements and decisions reached 
at Casablanca. These decisions reflected the type of compromise succeeding 
meetings would bring as the two great powers reconciled their strategic 
differences into a pattern for victory.
Trident and Its Sequel: Decision for Italy
Planning for the invasion of Sicily had been completed by early 
spring 1943, and prospects for launching an attack there by early summer 
were promising. A course of action to follow a Sicilian victory was not 
clear. Churchill became justifiably anxious therefore for a firm military 
plan for the armed forces to follow after the capture of Sicily. For 
their part, the British still had no doubt whatever about what the next 
step should be. At Casablanca, the British Chief of Imperial General 
Staff, Alanbrooke, had expounded a well-developed strategy for the conduct 
of the war in Europe: "to begin with the conquest of North Africa so as
to re-open the Mediterranean . . ., t]ien eliminate Italy, bring in Turkey, 
threaten southern Europe, and liberate France."
^Churchill, IV, p. 690.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p . 432.
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Churchill agreed with Alanbrooke, but so long as the American 
military staff continued their strong advocacy of cross-Channel action 
in place of an Italian invasion, he was certain that American agreement 
could be obtained only by another personal conference with the President.^ 
Accordingly, the President and Prime Minister decided on early May 1943, . 
as the date for the third Washington conference, which they named Trident.
At previous conferences with the Americans, the British had 
travelled with a large staff. Such an assembly of experts provided a 
means for quick, detailed, and accurate answers to almost any question 
which might arise during deliberations. Indeed, the British preparation 
went much further, for their proposals were consistently worked out in 
great detail and were well coordinated with British foreign policy. 
Churchill's close relationship with his military staff insured the required 
balance between policy and the military decisions to enforce it.
In contrast, the Americans had arrived at the earlier conferences 
with small staffs and plans expressed only in general terms. Further, 
the American Chiefs of Staff could not be certain of the support the 
President might give them as various British points were raised. To 
illustrate the differences existing in preparation for conference 
activity between the British and American staffs. General Wedemeyer,
United States Army Plans Division, who was present at the Casablanca 
conference, described the American Staff experience with the British 
there as follows :
^Churchill, IV, p. 782.
103
They swarmed down upon us like locusts, with a plentiful supply 
of planners and various other assistants, with prepared plans 
to insure that they not only accomplished their purpose but did 
so in stride and with fair promise of continuing the role of 
directing strategy the whole course ofthe war. I have the 
greatest admiration for them, as I indicated above; and if I 
were a Britisher, I would feel very proud. However, as an 
American, I wish that we might be more glib and better organ­
ized to cope with these super-negotiators. From a worm's eye 
viewpoint, it was apparent that we were confronted by generations 
and generations of experience in committee work, in diplomacy, 
and rationalizing points of view. They had us on the defensive 
practically all the time.l
The moral was plain following that conference: that the military
staff of the United States, in preparing for later meetings, should not 
only emulate, but also improve on, British thoroughness and firmness in 
presenting a united front. An essential part of this preparation would 
be thorough, realistic staff planning on a joint basis which would permit 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrive at timely, binding agreements on the 
military course to be followed. Furthermore, these preparations would, 
to the degree possible, be coordinated with the White House, and advance 
presidential approval would be obtained. American staff officers had 
learned that unless the latter action was taken, military aims, regardless 
of how broadly or in what detail they may have been conceived, were subject 
to negotiation when the President and Prime Minister worked out compromises 
in the light Of respective national policies.
As at past conferences, the British arrived at Trident with a 
large staff, which was well prepared and which presented a united front. 
This time, following Wedemeyer's suggestions, the American staff was much
^Wedemeyer, p. 192.
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larger, much better organized, and better prepared to argue its case 
than at any previous gathering of the kind.
Lord Ismay, who was Churchill's Chief of Staff in the Ministry of 
Defense, described the manner in which work at this and succeeding mid­
war conferences was conducted:
Each day . . . the British Chiefs of Staff and the American Joint 
Chiefs of Staff met independently. At 11 a.m., the two teams 
joined together for a Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, accompanied 
by such advisers as the questions under discussion required . . . 
often there was a second combined meeting in the afternoon. 
Periodically, there were plenary conferences at the White House, 
presided over by the President and the Prime Minister. At these, 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported progress, sought approval, 
and were given directions for their future work.1
Both the President and the Prime Minister made opening speeches 
at the Trident gathering. Their comments succinctly exposed the essence 
of the Anglo-American differences regarding action in the Mediterranean 
area. The single most pressing question was whether to continue with the 
Mediterranean campaign or to concentrate on the cross-Channel operation. 
Churchill noted with satisfaction that "we have heed able, by taking 
thought together, to produce a succession of brilliant events which have 
altered the whole course of the war. He then proceeded to enumerate 
the many advantages in plans to invade Italy, his foremost recommendation. 
Primary among these advantages would be the loss to Germany of the 
Italian fleet and the twenty-six Italian divisions stationed in the 
Balkan countries. Churchill was also optimistic that Allied success in 
Italy would bring Turkey into the war against Germany and permit passage
^Ismay, p. 295. 
^Churchill, IV, p. 791.
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of supplies to Russia through the Dardanelles. The Prime Minister also 
expressed concern in providing relief to Russia. He considered "the 
best way of taking the weight off the Russian front in 1943 would be 
to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send 
a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans."^ In descending 
scale of priority, Churchill mentioned the need to keep large forces in 
contact with the enemy during 1943. He thought such action was necessary, 
because it was now evident that a cross-Channel attack could not be 
launched before 1944. Last in priority on his objectives list was aid 
to China and study of a long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.
In his turn, the President agreed that a decision for action be­
yond Sicily was necessary. He was also concerned that the more than 
twenty divisions of Anglo-American battle trained troops be effectively 
employed. The President felt, however, that the cross-Channel invasion 
must take place as early as possible and not later than the spring of 
1944. "He reiterated his frequently expressed determination to concen­
trate our military effort first on destruction of Nazi military power 
before engaging in any collateral c a m p a i g n s . H e  felt that the only 
way to force Germany to fight and thus aid Russia was the strike through 
France^ as advocated by the American military staff. The President was
^Churchill, IV, p. 792.
^William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Wittlesey House, 1950),
p. 159.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 503.
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also very much concerned with keeping China in the war. He said that 
priority aid to China in 1943 and 1944 must be considered.^
With such guidance from their highest authorities, the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff met on the following day (May 13, 1943). From the be­
ginning there was an atmosphere of tension. Lord Ismay has reported 
that "as soon as the controversial question of future operations after 
the capture of Sicily came under discussion, it was clear that there was 
going to be a battle r o y a l . A d m i r a l  Leahy, the Chairman of the American 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, presided over the initial meeting and reported 
British refusal to consider any major military undertaking during 1943 
outside the Mediterranean. Leahy was much concerned by this British 
attitude, for "President Roosevelt . . . had directed me to press for a
OBritish-American invasion of Europe at the earliest possible date."
American arguments concerning a cross-Channel attack in 1943 
were well known to the British. The arguments remained essentially, the 
same at this conference. American doubts concerning British reasons for 
non-concurrence with the 1943 cross-Channel venture also continued un­
changed. The arguments and doubts of both nations can be summarized.
The American proposal for a 1943 attack along the French Channel 
coast, with the possibility of a smaller "emergency" 1942 attack, had 
been accepted by the British in April 1942. Scarcely a month later the 
British reversed themselves and, instead, pressed for the North African




campaign, later Jcno’t'm as Torchi Resolution of the deadlock between the 
respective national staffs proved impossible, and the President told his 
staff to agree on action in some other theater where American troops 
could engage the Germans in 1942. In the face of British stubbornness, 
little choice remained for them, and the American Chiefs of Staff finally 
agreed to Torch, with the clear understanding that there was still to be 
a 1943 cross-Channel attack. (Since Operation Torch and the resulting 
Tunisian campaign took longer to complete than planned, the 1943 cross- 
Channel schedule became impossible.) In spite of this delay, the British 
were now proposing a sequential move to the Italian mainland which, they 
claimed, would take Italy out of the war. Although capitulation of Italy 
might well result if the British plan were accepted, the Americans were 
not convinced that such a victory would be a significant contribution 
toward the defeat of Germany. Meanwhile, support of an Italian venture 
would certainly preclude an adequate force build-up in England, a necessary 
prerequisite for a cross-Channel effort in 1944. Indeed, the Americans 
continued to be suspicious of British intentions to land troops in France 
at all. Some American staff members were convinced that Britain would 
postpone such a landing as long as possible, and perhaps avoid it 
altogether.
The British had arguments to counter the American fears. Their 
leaders considered the strategy they advocated as being justified by the 
success of Operations Torch. In their eyes, American doubt was unwarranted. 
The British felt that the only difference which existed between themselves 
and the Americans over the cross-Channel attack was one of timing. They 
agreed now that such an attack was the only way for delivery of the final
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blow against Germany. However, British experience with opposed landings 
in former wars had proved costly, and they felt an attack on the coast of 
France in 194$ would be premature and, if launched, would result in a 
repetition of those costly failures of the past. During conference pro­
ceedings, Alanbrooke explained a number of times in great detail that the 
British wished to disperse French-based German troops prior to the 
launching of a cross-Channel attack. Such was the goal of so-called 
peripheral forays^ which his staff advocated. They were convinced that
a drastic reduction in these German forces was necessary before the dual
tasks of troop landings and establishment of sufficient supply and admini­
strative bases could be accomplished. In early conference arguments, the 
British developed as additional prerequisites to the cross-Channel invasion 
air superiority and interruption of German lines of communication, which 
were vital between the German eastern front and France. Finally, the 
British argued there were deficiencies in numbers of landing craft and 
similar shipping capability. They insisted these were so important to the 
success of the cross-Channel operation that the action should be delayed, 
pending availability of adequate equipment.
Against such a backdrop of tension and disagreement, the doubt 
expressed by Alanbrooke in his diary, that any good could come of the 
conference,2 was understandable. With each side convinced of its respec­
tive wisdom, compromise appeared remote. Past conferences had concluded 
with the British winning most of their debated points, particularly in the
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 513.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 504.
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military arena. However, at Trident the Americans were not only better 
prepared to support a debate, but the staff had also been able to hold 
valuable preliminary discussions with the President in which they had 
won him over to their side. Thus the United States delegation had 
entered the conference in the favorable posture of being united in favor 
of cross-Channel operations as the highest priority for combined action.
With each conference participant well prepared and convinced of 
the merits of their respective positions, concerted effort was required 
in the search for an effective compromise. As spokesman for the British 
effort, Alanbrooke asserted the elimination of Italy would ease the 
formidable tasks attendant upon an Anglo-American force landing in north­
west Europe from the British Isles. British Air Chief Marshall Portal 
was of the opinion that the balance of forces on the continent would 
change more quickly in Allied favor if Mediterranean operations were 
undertaken before launching a cross-Channel attack. Summarizing this 
point of view, Alanbrooke expressed the British Chiefs' firm intention 
to execute the cross-Channel operation as soon as sufficiently favorable 
conditions would arise in 1944, but that in the meantime Allied action 
bearing directly against Germany should consist of intensified bombard­
ment . ̂
General Marshall was again the foremost spokesman and negotiator 
for the United States staff on European strategy. It became apparent to 
him as the impasse continued that emphasis on air operations might provide 
a means toward compromise. Inasmuch as the British chiefs were thinking
iMatloff, p. 129.
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in terms of British bases for air attack, limited action in Italy and
resultant provision of bomber bases there from which to attack Germany
1could be. justified. Moreover, such limited Italian action should be 
possible with the forces already at Eisenhower's disposal in the 
Mediterranean theater.
Therefore, Marshall began to advocate the use of air strength 
from the Mediterranean. Responding to this relaxation in the American 
position, the British staff became more amenable to the cross-Channel 
operation in 1944 provided the Americans were willing to a scaling down
of its size; The result of these conversations was a kind of "back door"
approach to compromise, which provided concessions agreeable to both 
sides. The Americans could agree to limited action in Italy if they had 
a firm date against which to plan the 1944 cross-Channel invasion, albeit 
with lesser force. The British, in the absence of better terms, could 
agree with a firm date for cross-Channel operations provided the "Italian
prize" could be exploited.
Once these major concessions were made, the debate concerning 
optimum action in both theaters could be narrowed down to the availability 
of strength and resources. The British first estimate of requirements 
for a 1944 cross-Channel action had called for 8,500 landing ships and 
similar craft to lift simultaneously ten divisions. Both Marshall and 
his chief planner. General Wedemeyer, termed this requirement a "logis­




concluded that, assuming continued Mediterranean action after Sicily, 
enough landing craft could be provided in England by the spring of 1944 
to lift only five divisions, three in the assault wave and two in the 
follow up wave, in a simultaneous operation. However, they felt that 
that number might be sufficient.^ American planning estimates as finally 
accepted by the conference for guidance to the cross-Channel planners 
were thus half the original British estimate. In order to win firm 
British agreement to a definite operation with a definite target date,
the Americans agreed to the smaller force. As a further concession, the
Americans also agreed that the 1943 landing craft production rates, 
rather than the higher 1944 rates, would suffice as planning factors.
In this way, the time for a cross-Channel operation could become firmly 
committed.
In return for this British concession, the Americans yielded to 
the British insistence for limited Mediterranean operations. The United 
States staff indicated their willingness to plan with the object of 
eliminating Italy from the war. However, no precise plan for accom­
plishing this was adopted by the conference. Instead, General Eisenhower, 
Commander in Chief for North Africa, was instructed to plan such operations 
on the basis of having available twenty-seven divisions of troops. The 
final decision for mounting the operation, however, was to be reserved to 




It must be remembered that Churchill had suggested the Trident 
meetings to achieve agreement on the invasion of Italy. The conference 
results, therefore, were disappointing to the Prime Minister. "As this 
was the main purpose for which.I had crossed the Atlantic, I could not 
let the matter rest. He appealed to Hopkins for aid in obtaining a 
more definite decision concerning Italy from Roosevelt. Although 
sympathetic with the Prime Minister's anxiety, Hopkins was doubtful that 
the United States Chiefs would be overruled. Not to be defeated, 
Churchill proposed to visit the North African Headquarters enroute to 
England for discussion of Italian possibilities with Eisenhower, whose 
staff would have planning responsibility for any action taken. Roosevelt 
agreed that such a visit would be useful in providing Eisenhower and his 
staff a more complete understanding of the Trident deliberations. There­
fore, when the Prime Minister expressed a feeling of awkwardness should 
decisions be.taken in favor of the British desires, the President asked 
Marshall to accompany the party.^
The time spent with Eisenhower and staff extended just over a 
week and had far-reaching effect on the final decision in favor of the 
Italian invasion. The visit also provided a unique opportunity for these 
high level command personnel to observe the battlefield situation at 
close range.
The first meeting was held at Eisenhower's villa on May 29, 1943. 
In attendance were Churchill, Alanbrooke, Alexander, Cunningham, Tedder,
^Churchill, IV, p. 810.
^Churchill, IV, p. 811.
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Ismay, Marshall, Bedell Smith, and Eisenhower. The visitors brought 
Eisenhower and his staff up to date by means of a briefing on the Trident 
decision. They also emphasized the fact that among the Allies only the 
Russian land forces would be able to produce decisive results in 1943. 
Following the briefing, the crucial issue, the mounting of an Italian 
campaign, was raised. Eisenhower's initial reaction was that if Italy 
was to be knocked out of the war, it should be done "immediately after 
Sicily and with all the means at our disposal . . . (he felt) that this 
would simplify his problems. If Sicily were to succ.eed",-^s'ay~within a 
week, he would at once cross the straits and establish a bridgehead."^ 
Marshall suggested that since no firm decision could be made until the 
result of the attack on Sicily were known, it might be wise to set up 
two forces: one to plan for Sardinia and Corsica, and the other for
operation against the mainland of Italy. Then, when sufficient facts 
for decision became available, both forces would move against the 
objective then decided upon.^ Eisenhower and Alexander agreed that, 
depending upon the ease of operations in Sicily, they would prefer Italy 
as the next step.
In view of the general agreement at the first meeting, Churchill 
"tried to clinch matters"^ at the next and last meeting on May 31. He 
had marshalled all the facts in a paper called "Background Notes" and 
had circulated it for use by all the principals before the meeting. It
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 520.
^Churchill, IV, p. 819.
3Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 522.
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is evident that the Prime Minister did his utmost to wring from Eisenhower 
and Marshall agreement for action against Italy which could be wired 
immediately to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval. He was unable 
to win over Marshall who, although not in disagreement with the ideas ex­
pressed, would not agree to a clear-cut decision until after the attack 
on Sicily had begun. Following Marshall's lead, Eisenhower saw that he, 
would have to await developments and in the light of them advise the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff plans and recommendations for follow-on operations. 
Alanbrooke recorded in his diary for May 31 "the situation is on the whole 
much as we settled it in Washington, which is as it should be.
Developments testify to the success of the Churchill-sponsored 
North African journey. Such discussions, conducted as they were by men 
held in high esteem by battle commanders, served, to remove doubt from 
the minds of key people in the field as to preferred decisions. This 
visit is typical of Churchill's willingness to travel anywhere at almost 
any time in the interest of furthering the Anglo-American cause. By 
bringing pertinent political factors and his own personal convictions 
into play during the decision making process, he was able to hasten 
progress toward his goal. Since he commanded the respect of his fellow 
American allies at all levels, few Allied decisions were made and executed 
without his strong influence. Indeed, up until Trident, his voice appeared 
to be the most dominant.
That the American strategic cause made gains at Trident is at­
tributable to better staff preparation. Even more important was Marshall's
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p . 522.
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ability to present the American case to Roosevelt with such firm con­
viction that the President agreed. From a political point of view, the 
American President had a considerably freer hand in administering the 
.United States war effort than had the British Prime Minister. Further­
more, Roosevelt had a strong tendency toward making the final decision 
for his country in matters pertaining to warfare. Therefore, once his 
military advisers gained his complete confidence and convinced him of 
their strategic wisdom, it became more difficult for the Prime Minister 
to bring the President's ideas into line with his own. We know from 
Admiral Leahy's account of the final Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting with 
the President in preparation for Trident that:
It was determined that the principal objective of the American 
Government would be to pin down the British to a cross-Channel 
invasion of Europe at the earliest practicable date and to make 
full preparations for such an operation by the spring of 1944.1
Hence, the President deliberately decided to support his staff in 
obtaining British agreement to early /cross-Channel operation. An official 
Army historian of the period has said there is no clear explanation of 
Roosevelt's motives for taking such a stand .at the time.̂  But whatever 
the pressures upon the President and whatever his motives, at last he and 
his staff were of one mind in trying to obtain decisions and plans for the 
American military objective - a Second 'Front. The success they enjoyed 
was sufficient as a preliminary step. The next step took place less than 
three months later at the first Quebec Conference, which was named Quadrant.
l-Leahy, .pp. 157-158.
OMaurice Matloff indicates by footnote that: "Searches of the official 
files in Washihgton and of the Roosevelt and Hopkins papers at Hyde Park have yielded no records of the meetings of 2 May and 8 May of the JCS with the 
President at the White House. The only record - -even in published accounts - 
that has turned up is in Admiral Leahy's memoirs. (Matloff, p. 125).
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Quadrant; A Plan is Agreed 
It is interesting to note that the American strategy for cross- 
Channel action, and insistence upon adherence to it, became progressively 
firmer even as British success in obtaining an invasion of Italy developed. 
A strong element in this hardening of Roosevelt's support for a cross- 
Channel invasion seems to have been the earnest convictions expressed to 
him by Secretary of War Stimson following the Secretary's July 1943 visit 
to Europe and North Africa. His report, complete with conclusions, is 
outlined in detail in the Stimson m e m o i r s T h e  Secretary based his 
arguments on several main points. First, the Combined Chiefs of Staff . 
planning group responsible for cross-Channel planning had told him that 
the plan was sound, but that its time schedule could not withstand any 
interference from new or unprogrammed actions. Therefore, Stimson wanted 
to forestall any interference with the plan or its execution. Secondly, 
in discussions with Churchill, the Secretary of War detected a British 
fear that a German counterattack after landings of Allied forces in 
France might succeed. Stimson felt this fear dampened British willingness 
to mount the attack. For his part, Stimson thought assurances from the 
air commanders that they could block German reinforcements were adequate.^ 
General Eisenhower had made a convincing third point which the Secretary 
presented to Roosevelt. The General had suggested the possibility of 
limiting the war in Italy to capturing air bases there. The latter were 
of great value in prosecution of the air battle against Germany, because
^Stimson and Bundy, pp. 429-438. ■
2Stimson and Bundy, p. 431.
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they would provide more ready access to targets in southeastern Germany.^ 
Such argument as the latter point was reminiscent of Marshall's arguments 
during Casablanca and Trident talks.
The most effective of the conclusions reached by Stimson and
presented by him to the President just before the Quadrant Conference
is quoted as follows :
I believe, therefore, that the time has come for you to decide 
that your government must assume the responsibility of leadership 
in this great final movement of the European war which is now 
confronting us. We cannot afford to confer again and close with 
a lip service tribute to Bolero (the cross-Channel build up in 
England) which we have tried and failed to carry out. We cannot 
afford to begin the most dangerous operation of the war under 
half-hearted leadership which will invite failure or at least 
disappointing results. Nearly two years ago the British offered 
us this command. I think that now it should be accepted —  if ‘ 
necessary, insisted on.^
Stimson's point concerning only "lip service tribute" to Bolero 
was well taken, for twice had joint instructions been given to prepare 
a cross-Channel action only to have the force diverted— to North Africa, 
in the first instance, and to Sicily in the second. When these diversions 
occurred, the American men and equipment not required for the alternative 
course of action were invariably diverted to the Pacific theater.
While in the early stages of mobilization, the Americans could 
replenish the Bolero losses without severe impact on field operations 
provided the rate of build up remained slow. However, as production 
began to reach capacity, and as military and industrial demands for 
manpower increased, it would become impossible to supply forces and
^Stimson and Bundy, p. 433.
^Stimson and Bundy, p. 437.
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equipment to each of several hlgh-consumption theaters. Therefore, as 
preparations for Quadrant were made, the military departments approached 
a supply and personnel crossroads. If the Pacific action was to con­
tinue on the scale already in progress at that time, then a choice had 
to be made for the locale of full scale action against Germany— either 
Italy or France— not both.
The British had consistently argued for the Mediterranean plan, 
and all’ Anglo-American actions in that theater had been successful. 
Hence, Churchill and staff approached Quadrant in the same conceptual 
frame of mind as in the past--application of whatever force was required 
for victory against Italy.^
The American "crossroads" situation disturbed Marshall, for 
some of his army planners were beginning to fear the Mediterranean 
trend had gone so far as to be almost irreversible. Therefore, they 
were beginning to favor a settlement of differences and at least be 
unified with the British in one theater or the other. General Hull, 
Chief of the Operations Plans Division Theater Group, expressed the 
disturbing trend of thought in a memorandum to his chief during mid- 
July 1943 :
Although from the very beginning of this war, I have felt that 
the logical plan . . . was . . . across Channel by the most 
direct route, our commitments to the Mediterranean have led me 
to the belief that we should now reverse our decision and pour 
our resources into the exploitation of our Mediterranean 
operations.%
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p.̂  579.
^Matloff, p. 165.
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General Hull and others were discouraged by the sharp contrast 
between original plans supporting the Bolero build-up and the actual 
force available in England. Their attitude is unders'taiidable when one 
considers that the first estimate was that the United States could have 
over a million men and 4,000 airplanes in England by April 1943. Actually 
by that date, the United States had only 109,137 troops and 873 aircraft. 
On the other hand, by July 1, 1943, the United States had 540,087 troops 
and 4,087 planes in the Mediterranean area.^
Although Marshall and his chief planner. General Wedemeyer, never 
faltered in their conviction about the feasibility and necessity for „ . 
cross-Channel effort, they were pleased that, during this period of the 
doldrums for their planning staff, a cross-Channel plan, which had been 
directed during the Trident conference, was completed. A product of the 
combined planning staff in England, the plan was for Overlord, the 
eventual cross-Channel operation. Submitted to the United States staff 
in Washington only a week before the conferees gathered at Quebec for 
Quadrant, the Overlord Plan provided Marshall a vehicle for use in 
attracting and holding the President's support for firm cross-Channel 
force and re-affirmation of the Trident agreed time of May 1944.
Thus, the plan for Overlord plus the above mentioned Stimson 
arguments combined to harden Roosevelt's resolve to insist upon early 
Channel operation during the Quadrant meetings. One other discussion 




for the proposed May 1944 action against the French coast. That conver­
sation took place at the White House on August 10, 1943, when the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff joined the President and the Secretary of War to discuss 
Quadrant. The Secretary qualified a statement by the President which 
had indicated that Churchill favored operations against the Balkans. 
Stimson's qualification was that the Prime Minister while disclaiming 
any wish to land troops in the Balkans did feel that gains were possible 
there if allied supplies to the Balkans peoples could be increased.
Stimson affirmed, however, that the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony
1Eden, wanted the Allies to invade the Balkans. These comments led the
President to express the philosophy underlying his conduct of the war
and his desire for the post war period. He acknowledged the British
Foreign Office's desire to forestall Soviet influence in the Balkans by
getting there first. However ;
He did not believe the USSR desired to take over the Balkan 
States but rather the USSR wished to establish kinship with 
other Slavic people . . .  It is unwise (he stated) to plan 
military strategy based on a gamble as to political results.^
Thus, it can be seen that Roosevelt's attention was becoming more and 
more focussed on the post-war world, free of favored positions, con­
trolled by a new community of United Nations. In view of this 
orientation, he could not agree with the pragmatic establishment of 
one national influence (the British) ,in a physical position (the 




balance of power tradition. To forestall any British tendencies in this 
direction, Roosevelt may well have decided that day to make the growing 
power of his nation the dominant force in mounting Overlord. Such a' 
decision would certainly justify his expressed wish to provide "a larger 
force in Great Britain . . .  so that as soon as possible and before the 
actual time of landing (on French soil) we should have more soldiers in 
Britain dedicated to the purpose than the British."^
Several days after these remarks by the President, Quadrant 
convened. Initial discussions between the members of the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff concentrated on resolving the question of whether the main effort 
would be made from England or in the Mediterranean. As was usual at these 
conferences. General Marshall again was the principal American spokesman, 
pertinent facts being supplied him by a well-organized supporting staff.
A similar alignment was present for the British partner, with Sir Alan- 
brooke as the chief British spokesman, ably assisted by Air Marshal Sir 
Charles Portal.
In accordance with previous American decisions, the American 
representatives proposed that Overlord be given overriding priority over 
other operations in the European theater. Somewhat as a surprise to the 
Americans, Alanbrooke indicated complete agreement that Overlord should 
be the major offensive for 1944, but he went on to stress the absolute 
necessity of first achieving the main conditions upon which success of 
the plan depended;
^Stimson and Bundy, p. 438.
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(1) . . . Substantial reduction in the strength of German fighter
aircraft in northwest Europe.
(2) . . . Not more than twelve mobile German divisions in northern
France at the time the operation was launched, and . . . not
possible for the Germans to build up more than fifteen divisions 
in the succeeding two months.
(3) . . . The problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the
tidal waters must be overcome.1
Alanbrooke insisted that the main British aim of the Italian operations
was to force the Germans to shift much of their force from northwestern
France to Italy, thereby weakening the German defenses in France to
levels satisfactory for mounting the Overlord plan.
Such an agreeable interchange would tend to forecast smooth 
progress toward final agreement. This was not the case, however, for 
American doubts concerning the facts supporting the British provisos were 
evident. To begin with. Overlord called for the transfer of seven 
divisions from the Mediterranean to support the cross-Channel operation. 
Such an allocation had been decided upon at the Trident conference, and 
guidelines to Overlord planners had been issued. Eisenhower had indi­
cated to Marshall that he could operate the planned limited Italian 
effort without the seven divisions.
The British disagreed and argued that withdrawal of the seven 
divisions from Italy would jeopardize the possibility in diverting 
German troops from France to Italy. In their view, a decision to grant 
"overriding priority to Overlord" would thus be "too b i n d i n g . I n  
consideration of this British objection, Marshall was able to exhibit
^Churchill, V, p. 77 
^Matloff, p. 215. 
^Matloff, p. 221.
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some flexibility. Prior to the conference, Roosevelt had asked him if 
the seven divisions, which Overlord would withdraw from Italy, could 
not be replaced with seven new divisions. Marshall replied that to do 
so would have some adverse impact on the Bolero build up, but the 
principal difficulty would be encountered in transporting the new di­
visions. Notwithstanding, a new force could be available^o the
Mediterranean by June 1944.^ Nothing more had been done about this
force of men, however, because of Eisenhower's indication that he could
get along without them. With such flexibility available to provide a
force of this approximate size, the Americans withdrew from their position
of "overriding priority" for Overlord. In its place the President agreed
to the more ambiguous ;
As between Operations Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean, 
where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will 
be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring 
success of Overlord.2
Fearing that Mediterranean ventures might thus be permitted to drain off
vital strength from the cross-Channel operation, the Americans argued
for and obtained a saving clause that "all Mediterranean operations
would be carried out (on the basis of) forces allotted at Trident.
Churchill strongly favored Overlord for 1944 provided the con­
ditions presented by Alanbrooke were met. Additionally, the Prime 
Minister insisted;
^Matloff, p. 213.
^Ray S. Cline, United States Army in World War II, The War De­
partment, Washington Command Post; The Operations Division (Washington; 
Department of the Army, 1951), p. 225.
^Cline, p. 225.
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That every effort should be made to add at least twenty-five 
per cent to the first assault five divisions versus the 
three called for in the plan. This would mean finding more 
landing craft. But there were still nine months to go, and 
much could be done in that time . . . Above all the initial 
lodgment must be strong.1
Always alert to insuring a strong partnership with the United States,
as shown by his earnest cooperation in this argument, Churchill took
another most important step during Quadrant towards settling the command
of the cross-Channel action. Since the United States forces would be
dominant in the Overlord operation, or would be soon after a continental
bridgehead had been established, the Prime Minister recommended to
Roosevelt that an American commander be designated. Although Churchill's
logic was unimpeachable, previous plans had envisioned a British commander,
and at least tentatively, Alanbrooke had been promised the assignment.^
In making this offer, Churchill (probably by divination) not only met the
President's desire for an American commander, but he also forcefully
demonstrated his dedication to the vital Anglo-American cooperation most
important to his established goal of victory.
Quadrant was not the last conference in the Anglo-American 
cooperation; nor were the arguments finished as to distribution of 
forces and locale of application. However, decisions for the place, 
means, and time to meet Russia's continuing demand for a strong Second 
Front were stated at Quebec. As an individual conference of the midwar 
period, Quadrant was noted for relatively few unusual accomplishments.
^Churchill, V, p. 85. 
^Churchill, V, p. 85.
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Decisions made there were sufficiently firm to provide dependable 
guidance to operational and logistical planners of both military 
establishments. Following these decisions, both political and military 
chiefs were justified in assigning their top level talent to the 
leadership of Overlord. All levels of authority could respond posi­
tively and with confidence to the challenge now scheduled for May 1944.
Quadrant also brought to light a marked change in Churchill's 
attitude toward the cross-Channel attack. A number of reasons might 
account for his quick agreement that Overlord must receive maximum 
support. He must have been impressed by Secretary Stimson's arguments 
during the letter's visit to England in July. The Prime Minister knew 
the growth rates of production and military manning in the United States. 
He knew that this force had to be used in an optimum manner. He also 
recognized the strategic logic of supporting an operation desired by a 
partner who would supply more than half the invasion force. The most 
important stimulus to Churchill's support of the May date may well have 
been his realization that this might be his last change to bring the 
massive American strength against Hitler with such devastation. Surely 
he was aware of the frustration and dissatisfaction the British strategic 
arguments (although perhaps completely valid) had caused in American 
circles of command. American threats to pick up the "Pacific alternative" 
might cease to be bluff. He could not permit that to happen, for as much 
as he favored the Italian action, he also knew that attack through Italy 
alone was not likely to defeat Germany, and decisive victory over Germany 
continued to be his primary goal.
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Cairo-Teheran: A Goal is Reached
Toward the end of the Quadrant conference, Washington learned 
that Stalin had agreed to meetings in Moscow of the United States, 
British, and Soviet foreign secretaries. The meetings were to be ex­
ploratory in character and were to pave the way for a later conference of 
the three chiefs of government.^ During these discussions, which took 
place 19-30 October 1943, the Anglo-American Quadrant plans for the in­
vasion of Europe were described by the Military Observers of the party. 
Major General John R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission 
to Moscow, and General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, British Chief of Staff for 
the Ministry of Defense. The two generals assured the Russians that at 
each of the successive British-American conferences from Casablanca 
through Quadrant the necessity of aiding the Soviet Union had been a 
cardinal consideration. They reaffirmed the decision of the Trident and 
Quadrant conferences to invade France in the spring of 1944. Deane went 
further and advised Russia that the United States Military Mission would 
keep the Soviet staff fully informed of progress in the preparation for 
Overlord. Later Deane told General Marshall that "the^Soviet delegation 
appeared to be completely satisfied with the sincerity of British and 
American intentions.
^Sherwood, p. 749; Churchill, V, pp. 277-283, contains a dis­
cussion of the background of the Moscow Conference; Hull, II, pp. 1247- 
1280, discusses in detail the political background of the conference 
from the United States point of view.
^Letter, Deane to Marshall, October 29, 1943, as cited by 
Matloff, p. 295.
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Faithful adherence to this Anglo-American pledge to Russia
seemed essential to the Americans not only in order to avoid strategic
stalemate in Europe but also to strengthen relations of the United Nations
as foreshadowed by the accomplishments of the Moscow Conference.^ They
became uneasy, however, as various warning signals arose. Stimson has
recorded "further alarms" from the Prime Minister who, through British
Foreign Minister Eden, informed the Russians that a delay of Overlord
for one or two months might be necessary if the Italian campaign failed
2to progress satisfactorily. Also at about this time. General Deane,
Chief of the United States Military Mission to Moscow, warned the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff that the Americans might be confronted with a demand for 
expanded action in the Mediterranean. In his opinion, the Russians, 
although eager as ever about a Second Front, might push for more immediate 
relief from German pressure if such were possible as a result of enlarged 
Mediterranean action.^
Thus by early November 1943, the American military staff believed 
themselves to be faced with possible modifications to the Quadrant de­
cisions as well as reopening the whole problem of European strategy.
Their concern resulted not only from the prospect of further arguments
%ull, II, pp. 1280-1307, This volume contains detailed first­
hand account of the political discussions and agreements at Moscow.
^Stimson and Bundy, p. 439; Churchill, V, pp. 289-293. The 
Prime Minister's objective was to insure Stalin understood the Italian 
problem which would result from moving seven divisions from Italy to 
England for Overlord. This Eden-Stalin discussion may have given Stalin 
the idea for the invasion of southern France as an adjunct to Overlord. 
Such a tactic was discussed at the time.
^Message, Deane to Marshall, November 11, 1943, as cited by 
Matloff, p. 303.
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with the British, but they now had the prospect of difficulties with the 
Russians. Stalin had finally agreed to a date and place for a meeting 
of the three heads of governments. Teheran was the place, and November 28 
to December 1, 1943, was the time. Since another Anglo-American summit 
meeting was also needed to clarify the questions concerning problems of 
strategy in all theaters, a combined conference was arranged. The primary 
Anglo-American political discussions and the routine Combined Chiefs of 
Staff meetings were conducted at Cairo, both before and after the political 
summit deliberations at Teheran. That part of the conference conducted 
at Cairo was named Sextant whereas the Teheran deliberations were called 
Eureka.
Preparations by the staffs'of both nations followed the- same 
pattern as for previous midwar conferences. Both sides were aware of 
the differences they had. The conference administration and techniques 
of procedure had become established and were well known by the conference 
principals, who had worked well together for considerable time. Admit­
tedly, there were adjustments due to mode of travel (both parties 
travelled to Cairo by battleship), and China was represented by 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and party, who attended those sessions 
where topics of their interest were discussed. However, the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff portion of the Cairo meetings was essentially routine.
The opening talks of European operations, however, were in­
conclusive, because each side was holding its full fire and only re­
hearsing its arguments for the meetings soon to take place with the 
Russians. This resulted from the situation to which the President
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referred at the plenary meeting in Cairo on the 24th of November that 
final decisions would depend on the outcome of discussions with Stalin 
at Teheran, Roosevelt went on to say that he felt the problem was 
primarily one of logistics; whether Overlord could be retained "in all 
its integrity" and, at the same time, the Mediterranean be kept "ablaze," 
He anticipated that Stalin would demand continued action in the Mediter­
ranean as well as Overlord, Just what future action in the eastern 
Mediterranean might be taken was, in the President's view, dependent 
upon the entry of Turkey into the war. This also would be discussed with 
Stalin, Although Roosevelt did not attempt to present American arguments 
at that session of the 24th, he did draw attention to the growing pre­
ponderance of the United States versus British overseas deployment.
In his turn, the Prime Minister indicated his dissatisfaction 
with events of the past two months in the Mediterranean, He recognized 
that the Italian campaign had been slowed by the withdrawal of the seven 
divisions transferred to the British Isles in preparation for Overlord.
He also lamented the failure to bolster the efforts of the Balkan guerilla 
activity and the loss of the Dodecanese Islands, It was his hope that 
the Russians would agree on the importance of bringing Turkey into the 
war. He emphasized that the British had no thought of advancing beyond 
the PisarRimini line, which should be the goal of the Italian campaign.
When these objectives in Italy had been reached, the decision would be 
made "whether we should move to the left or to the right." Finally, 
while Churchill emphasized that "Overlord remained at the top of the 
bill," he contended that it "should not be such a tyrant as to rule out
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every other activity in the Mediterranean." He considered a degree of 
elasticity necessary in the use of landing craft; the scheduled transfer 
of landing craft from the Mediterranean to England should be deferred for 
a few weeks.^
It was not until the 26th of November, the last day of the first 
part of the Cairo talks, that the Combined Chiefs were able to discuss 
seriously the strategy upon which they either could or must agree. The 
delay resulted from the presence of the Chinese representatives, who 
from Alanbrooke's point of view "understood nothing about strategy or 
higher tactics and were quite unfit to discuss theSe questions.During 
this meeting, however, an item of great importance to the future operations 
in the Mediterranean was thoroughly aired. On the 25th, the British 
Chiefs of Staff had proposed to take full advantage of all possible 
opportunities to threaten the Germans in as many areas as possible and 
thereby stretch German forces to the utmost. It was important to break 
the "German iron ring" that included Rhodes, Crete, and Greece. Rhodes 
being the key, it should have priority in capture, but operations 
against it would require more equipment from the western Mediterranean.3
^This drawing the line of essential differences between the two 
staffs was accomplished during the second plenary session at Cairo and 
is reflected in Minutes, Second Plenary Meeting, as they are included in 
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers 1943, The Conference at Cairo and Teheran (Washington; 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 330-334. Hereafter referred 
to as Foreign Relations 1943.
^Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (New York; Doubleday and 
Company, Inc., 1959), p. 56.
^Minutes of CCS 409, November 25, 1943, as cited by Matloff,
p. 354.
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The British Chiefs wished to obtain .agreement from the Americans to retain 
some of the landing craft scheduled for transfer to Overlord. The 
Americans, with Leahy, Marshall, and King again as primary staff spokes­
men, were willing to agree but only as a basis for discussion with the 
Soviet Staff at Teheran.^ Moreover, they had insisted on the 25th that 
an action planned against Burma (Operation Buccaneer), which had been 
promised Chiang Kai-shek, and which had been allocated landing craft, must 
not be interfered with as a result of the additional Mediterranean actions. 
During the deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the 26th, 
Alanbrooke raised the matter again to advise that if the Mediterranean 
ventures they wished were to be carried out, and if Operation Buccaneer 
was also to be mounted, the date of Overlord would be delayed. He advo­
cated "from a purely strategical aspect" that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
consider "putting off Operation Buccaneer since by so doing the full 
weight of our resources'could be brought to bear on Germany." Neither 
Marshall or Leahy could agree to accept postponement of Buccaneer for a 
number of reasons, but especially for political reasons involving the 
President's promise to the Generalissimo. Alanbrooke. has noted that 
"Marshall and I had the father and mother of a row I We had to come to 
an off the record meeting and then began to make some progress.
The matter was not resolved prior to the meetings at Teheran, 
however, and the uncertainty of the availability of landing craft,
^Minutes 131st Meeting CCS, 26 November 1943, as included in 
Foreign Relations 1943, p. 363.
^Minutes as footnote above, p. 364.
^Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 57.
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assigned to Buccaneer, for possible use in other operations created 
problems which had to be dealt with at Cairo after the Teheran conference 
was over.
Both Roosevelt and Churchill had tried for a long time to arrange
1the meeting with Stalin which finally took place on 29 November 1943.
For Roosevelt, it meant the opportunity to exercise his^charm oh"Stalin 
and firmly establish Russian support, so vital to his goal of post war 
international cooperation as a means of peace keeping. Churchill had 
mixed feelings. Up until this time, and until Overlord proved successful, 
the Prime Minister held victory as the major goal for his nation. He 
consistently had refused to admit political post war connotations to his 
Balkan military p r o p o s a l s .^ His suggestions to Roosevelt had usually 
found warm response. Teheran, however, might bring a change, for whereas 
in the past the Prime Minister had been at least half owner in the 
partnership for victory, once Roosevelt had made contact with Stalin, 
the British influence might wane. On the other hand, Churchill also 
knew how to deal with fellow statesmen. He too was vitally interested 
in the Russian ability to support his cause for he realized the war was 
not likely to be won without the smashing power of the Red army.
^"On December 14, 1941, Roosevelt wrote Stalin about his wish 
that they could meet personally . . . "  This statement is contained in 
Foreign Relations 1943, p. 3* Same reference allocates pp. 3-107 to 
"Pre-Conference Papers; Arrangements for the Conference." P. 8 same 
reference■indicates Churchill became involved in correspondence with 
Stalin concerning the Teheran visit in June 1943.
^Churchill told Stalin at Teheran "We ourselves have no ambitions 
in the Balkans. ' ATT we want to do is nail down these thirty hostile 
divisions." (Churchill, V, p. 367).
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Therefore, these two leaders of mighty nations approached Teheran in 
eager anticipation that they could collaborate with the "man of steel" 
to the mutual advantage of all three.
During the first Plenary session, Roosevelt reaffirmed to Stalin 
that Overlord was definitely set for the summer of 1944 and that during 
the preceding eighteen months, all military plans had revolved around 
the question of relieving the pressures on the Russian front. The 
President went further and strongly reaffirmed his opposition to any 
other venture which might delay the start of an immense cross-Channel 
invasion of Europe, reduce its force, or imperil its outcome. However, 
the President wanted allied forces to be used in such a way as to bring 
maximum aid to thé Soviet forces on the Eastern front. He added that 
some of the possibilities might involve a delay in Overlord and that 
before making any decision as to future extensions of operations in the 
Mediterranean, he and the Prime Minister wished to have the views of 
Marshal Stalin. Churchill agreed that the cross-Channel invasion was the 
highest priority, but he was also very much concerned with the Anglo- 
American forces then present in the Mediterranean a r e a was six 
months or more before Overlord was to begin and these forces could not 
stand idle.' He felt that the first objective should be to capture Rome 
and the airfields to the north. Advancing to the Pisa-Rimini Line, the 
position could be held with a minimum of force and the surplus used to • 
land in Southern France, move up the Rhone valley or to the northern 
Adriatic and northeast to the Danube.^ He also asserted that Turkey had
^Foreign Relations 1943, pp. 488-489-
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to be persuaded to enter the war, and subsequently persuaded to seize the
• 1 Aegean islands and open the Dardanelles.
Stalin tôok a differeiit position. He doubted that Turkey could 
be brought into the war, and although he felt the capture of Rome and 
the specified airfields was desirable, it was not a necessity. He was 
insistent in demanding the mounting of Overlord at the earliest possible 
time. He added that a pincers movement was always valuable and that a 
large scale operation against southern France, prior to the launch of 
Overlord, would serve in a very effective manner. He^feTtftEat the area 
of this supporting attack should be southern France rather than farther 
to the east as was suggested by Churchill.^
The President was easily convinced in favor of Stalin’s suggestion, 
for his own military staff had been advocating a similar theory of concen­
tration since early 1942. He was therefore insistent that the action 
for Overlord be firmly settled and that concentration of the force 
through France was the best way. His son, Elliot, who was present at 
the conference, reports that the President told him that:
The way to kill the most Germans, with the least loss of American 
soldiers, is to mount one great big invasion and then sTam 'em 
with everything we've got. It makes sense to me. It makes sense 
to Uncle Joe. It makes sense to all our generals . . .  It makes 
sense to the Red Army people. That's that. It's the quickest 
way to win the w a r . 3
^The Turkish Problem is discussed in Andre Visson, The Coming 
Struggle for Peace (New York: Viking Press, 1944), pp. 188-189.
^Foreign Relations 1943, pp. 555-564.
^Roosevelt, p. 185.
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Churchill presented his arguments in all his eloquence, but Stalin 
remained adamant. He was opposed to scattering the Allied forces in the 
Mediterranean. The clear hard fact was that the Soviet Union had seconded 
the American case for Overlord. Henceforth, the Prime Minister would be 
fighting a losing battle for secondary operations in the eastern Mediter­
ranean. Stalin insisted in his arguments that what had to be determined, 
arid the points were of major importance, were: the choice of a commander
for Overlord, the date for Overlord, and the matter of supporting opera- ■ 
tions to be undertaken in southern France in connection with Overlord.^
The Soviet reinforcement of the American military case, strongly
presented and defended by General Marshall on the staff level, permitted
the Très id ent to play more freely the middle man ' s .^le—between- the other
two chiefs of state. Years later Churchill, still convinced that the
failure at Teheran to addpt his policy was an error, wrote:
I could have gained Stalin, but the President was oppressed by the 
prejudices of his military advisers, and drifted to and fro in the 
argument, with the result that the whole of these subsidiary but 
gleaming opportunities were cast aside unused.%
Back in Cairo on the 3rd of December, 1943, discussion of the 
unfinished business concerning the decision for or against Buccaneer was 
resumed. At the plenary session on December 4, Churchill maintained that 
the additional attack on southern France would require the landing craft 
allocated for Buccaneer.^ To support further his contention that the
^Minutes Second Plenary Meeting, November 29, 1943, as contained 
in Foreign Relations 1943, p. 537.
^Churchill, V, p. 346.
^Churchill, V, pp. 411-412.
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amphibious support for China should be withdrawn, on December 5, a newly 
revised estimate for the manpower required for Buccaneer was received 
from Admiral Mountbatten. This new estimate was so much greater than 
previous estimates that to mount the operation as planned would be
impossible. Therefore, Marshall concurred with the British staff, and
_ __1_____Roosevelt reluctantly agreed to the abandonment of^ther'p'lan. Hence, the 
British won a point too. The partners could now join forces for Overlord. 
One of them, the Americans, had yielded on the Burma campaign in support 
of China in the interest of assuring early victory in Europe. The other, 
Britain, had yielded on the eastern Mediterranean operation.
Through the deliberations at Cairo and Teheran, the Anglo- 
American partnership solidified their strategy. The decision for a firm 
objective was made. Overlord became the main operation against which 
the two nations would bend their mutual efforts— at least in Europe.
In response to Stalin's three requirements for Overlord, the President:
(1) chose General Eisenhower as commander, because he felt "I could not 
sleep at night with you (Marshall) out of the c o u n t r y ; (2) set the 
date for May; and (3) agreed to Operation Anvil against southern 
France.
The new estimate was four times greater than the original. 
Mountbatten adequately justified the increase on a basis of immediate 
British and American experience in "island-hopping" operations, but 




Thé midwar compromises were now a common goal. National 
interests were merged in the final drive for victory over Nazi Germany. 
The period of closest cooperation was about to begin.^
^An editorial of the day said: "Thus the bell that tolls out
the world of Hitler and Tojo rings in a world of a possible democratic
future. It rings in a world not perfect, but livable, not certain but
now clearly approaching, for which the masses of common men have fought
and hoped." ("Four Men Reshape the World," The New Republic, A Journal 
of Opinion. CIX., (December 13, 1943).)
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
We have attempted to show in this study that national interests, 
as interpreted by respective leaders, have primary influence on the 
decisions of a cooperative international enterprise. Final decisions 
reflect the efforts of national leaders to attain their primary national 
goals as compromise becomes effective. We have seen that each of four 
fairly well-defined episodes or sets of events in the successful Anglo- 
American World War II cooperation reveal differences in opinion held by 
the main personalities. It is fair to add that tlie opinions of these 
people were based upon more than just the current facts with which they 
lived. The life experiences of Roosevelt and Churchill certainly colored 
their separate evaluations of world problems. Recollections of methods 
successfully employed before also greatly influenced the approach to 
solutions advocated by both men. We can't say beyond doubt how influ­
ential these recollections were, but they may have been dominant in 
Roosevelt's motivation. Herbert Feis calls this reference to previous
experience "historical memories", and has suggested them as having impact
1"on some of the outstanding decisions of American wartime diplomacy."
^Francis L. Loewenheim (ed.). The Historian and Diplomat (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 91.
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That the President concurred in the Wilson philosophy is clear. How­
ever, his recollection of the Wilson failure influenced him to proceed 
with caution both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, at the opportune 
moment, he moved to express to the world the principles which would 
support his hoped-for system of international cooperation. The moment 
was the Atlantic Conference, and the pronouncement was the Atlantic 
Charter.
Churchill was in agreement with Roosevelt's views, but more for 
reasons of what he considered to be Britain's primary goal of victory 
than for post-war purposes. By joining the United States in the issuance 
of such a proclamation as the Atlantic Charter, Britain established her­
self in close partnership with the nation upon whose resources her goal 
depended. Admittedly, bonus results of good feeling toward Britain would 
result from the non-Axis nations as a result of this adherence to high 
principles. However, at the time, the Prime Minister's primary conference 
objective was cementing relations with "our good friend"^ and advancing 
the cooperation.
The Atlantic Conference having enabled closer acquaintance and 
understanding between the two principals of the Anglo-American coop­
eration, a real working conference logically followed the violent entry 
of the United States into the war. Such a conference was Arcadia, where 
Anglo-American grand strategy had its beginning. The politico-military 
decisions which flowed from that first Washington conference were
^Churchill, III, p. 447.
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certainly a basis for victory plans and, as such, were satisfying to 
Churchill as he viewed his objectives. However, in Roosevelt's mind, 
another accomplishment at Arcadia was motivated by more than just à 
desire for victory. The agreement to a United Nations organization at 
that time was the President's second step toward his goal of global 
peace through international cooperation. Again Churchill joined in, 
but his goal at Arcadia was to affirm United States' commitment to a 
strategy of "defeat Germany first." Although Roosevelt agreed to such 
a sequence of action because of the military logic involved, the 
political climate in Europe at the time, or soon after, might well have 
been more important to him. We know of his eagerness to support Stalin, 
which stemmed in part from a desire to insure post-war Russian coop­
eration in peace arrangements and post-war settlements. Moreover, it is 
likely that the President was also vitally interested in having maximum 
European nationa support of his technique of insuring lasting world 
peace. For such additional political reasons, Roosevelt could not but 
agree that the war*in'Eufope had first priority on United States' 
resources.
Our third event had the appearance of crisis amid cooperation. 
Strategy had been decided at previous conferences. Indeed, details of 
the combined action required as a first effort were discussed during the 
Arcadia meetings. However, preparation for action seemed slow to the 
Americans, so they made two almost simultaneously moves for positive 
action, one military, and the other political. The Marshall Memorandum 
was the military move, which, in advocating early cross-Channel invasion.
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represented the American strategic philosophy of a direct approach. 
Roosevelt made the political move when he implied to Molotov the likeli­
hood of 1942 Anglo-American action for a Second Front. British con­
viction that such action would be courting disaster brought about the 
Second Washington Conference and Churchill's successful efforts to 
divert American force to a North African campaign. The resulting 
compromise decision satisfied in part all three influencing factors of 
our study. Roosevelt was aiding Stalin as promised, although in a some­
what restrained manner; Churchill's victory cause was pursued; and 
military action was in accord with British strategy of attrition, while 
at the same time acceding to the President's political demand for 
"action in 1942." Success of the North African venture should thus 
have fostered even stronger cooperation between the two allies, but 
Churchill's influence and Roosevelt's somewhat arbitrary political 
decision for the North African campaign generated suspicion and ill- 
feeling in American circles toward British military strategy.
These strategic differences played a i^eading role in the series
of events surrounding our fourth episode, during which time progressive
decisions were made for launching the cross-Channel invasion and a
Second Front. The basic differences had their source in respective
national capabilities and experiences. Whereas, the British utilized its
navy to supplement relatively small ground forces and wished, through
several small military actions, to disperse large and powerful German
concentrations of force, the Americans wished to mass relatively large
forces in a concentrated manner, "soften up" the enemy area by air attack, 
and mount an invasion.
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The British did not oppose a cross-Channel operation. Indeed, 
they agreed that it was necessary to final victory. However, the British 
differed with the Americans in the matter of when the attack should take 
place. British arguments notwithstanding, the American military leaders 
pressed for an early cross-Channel attack for a concentrated, quick, and 
decisive winning of the war. Since both the President and Prime Minister 
concerned themselves with bringing the Alliance through the war intact, 
with the hope of continuing it for purposes of peace, they concentrated 
on reconciling strategic differences. The result, as it emerged from 
the mid-war conferences, was a compromise slanted toward the American 
desire and was finally agreed as the Overlord Plan.
Although not discussed at length in the main body of this paper, 
two points, emphasized by the President throughout the'mid-war period, 
reflect the importance he attached to early and decisive action in a 
Second Front. The first point was his insistence that territorial and 
political settlements with the Allies be postponed until after the war, 
Indeed, in May 1942, he intervened during Anglo-lussian treaty negoti­
ations to oppose a guarantee of territorial concession£_to_the USSR, even 
though at the time Churchill was willing to yield to the Soviet desire. 
The second point reflecting the influence Roosevelt's post-war goals had 
on his mid-war stand on the Second Front was his formula of unconditional 
surrender. Although there has been strong feeling expressed, both pro 
and con, by a number of writers in the field, concerning the wisdom of 
the formula, it is preferable to accept the historian's reflection that 
"a statement of the only terms on which we would make peace did not mean.
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as has been alleged so often, that the President's military and 
political aims were unlimited."^ Rather, there was to be no compromise 
with those who fomented war. In effect, the President^wanted to drive 
a wedge between enemy governments and their people. His unconditional 
surrender statement was a dramatic slogan to serve notice on enemy and 
ally alike that there would be no "escape clauses" offered in exchange 
for peace as followed World War I. Thus, by adherence to postponement 
of territorial settlements and insistence upon "no strings attached" 
to suits for surrender, plus a decisive victory as promised by strong 
cross-Channel invasion, Roosevelt could appear at the peace table 
uncommitted. Then, from his and Churchill's dominant position within 
the center of a United Nations organization, they would foster the 
purposes, while avoiding the errors, of President Wilson's World War I 
experience.
^Loewenheim, pp. 109-110.
a p p e n d i x I
LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL 
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT^
10 Downing Street, Whitehall, 
December 8, 1940.
My Dear Mr. President,
1. As we reach the end of this year, I feel you will expect me to 
lay before you the prospects for 1941. I do so with candour and con­
fidence, because it seems to me that the vast majority of American 
citizens have recorded their conviction that the safety of the United 
States, as well as the future of our two Democracies and the kind of 
civilisation for which they stand, is bound up with the survival and 
independence of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Only thus can 
those bastions of sea-power, upon which the control of the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans depend, be preserved in faithful and friendly hands. 
The control of the Pacific by the United States Navy^nd of the Atlantic 
by the British Navy is indispensable to the security and trade routes
of both our countries, and the surest means of preventing war from 
reaching the shores of the United States.
2. There is another aspect. It takes between three and four 
years to convert the industries of a modern state to war purposes.
^Churchill, II, pp. 475-482.
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Saturation-point is reached when the maximum industrial effort that can 
be spared from civil needs has been applied to war production. Germany 
certainly reached this point by the end of 1939. We in the British 
Empire are now only about halfway through the second year. The United 
States, I should suppose, is by no means so far advanced as we. More-, 
over, I understand that immense programmes of naval, military, and air 
defence are now on foot in the United States, to complete which certainly 
two years are needed. It is our British duty in the common interest, 
as also for our own survival, to hold the front and grapple with the 
Nazi power until the preparations of the ' 1 States are complete.
Victory may come before two years are out; but we have no right to count 
upon it to the extent of relaxing any effort that is humanly possible. 
Therefore, I submit with very great respect for your good and friendly 
consideration that there is a solid identity of interest between the 
British Empire and the United States while these conditions last. It 
is upon this footing that I venture to address you.
3. The form which this war has taken, and seems likely to hold, 
does not enable us to match the immense armies of Germany in any theatre 
where their main power can be brought to bear. We can, however, by the 
use of sea-power and air-power, meet the German armies in regions where 
only comparatively small forces can be brought into action. We must do 
our best to prevent the German domination of Europe spreading into Africa 
and into Southern Asia. We have also to maintain in constant readiness 
in this island armies strong enough to make the problem of an oversea 
invasion insoluble. For these purposes we are forming as fast as possi­
ble, as you are already aware, between fifty and sixty divisions. Even
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if the United States were our ally, instead of our friend and indispensa­
ble partner, we should not ask for a large American expeditionary army. 
Shipping, not men, is the limiting factor, and the power to transport 
munitions and supplies claims priority over the movement by sea of large 
numbers of soldiers.
4. The first half of 1940 was a period of disaster for the Allies 
and for Europe. The last five months have witnessed a strong and perhaps 
unexpected recovery by Great Britain fighting alone, but with the in­
valuable aid in munitions and in destroyers placed at our disposal by 
the great Republic of which you are for the third time the chosen Chief.
5. The danger of Great Britain being destroyed by a swift, over­
whelming blow has for the time being very greatly receded. In its 
place, there is a long, gradually maturing danger, less sudden and less 
spectacular, but equally deadly. This mortal danger is the steady and 
increasing diminution of sea tonnage. We can endure the shattering of 
our dwellings and the slaughter of our civil population by indiscriminate 
air attacks, and we hope to parry these increasingly as our science 
develops, and to repay them upon military objectives in Germany as our 
Air Force more nearly approaches the strength of the enemy. The 
decision for 1941 lies upon the seas. Unless we can establish our 
ability to feed this island, to import the munitions of all kinds which 
we need, unless we can move our armies to the various theatres where 
Hitler and his confederate Mussolini must be met, and maintain them 
there, and do all this with the assurance of being able to carry it on 
tilllthe spirit of the Continental Dictators is broken, we may fall by 
the Way, and the time needed by the United States to complete her
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defensive preparations may not be forthcomirig. It is, therefore, in 
shipping and in the power to transport across the oceans, particularly 
the Atlantic Ocean, that in 1941 the crunch of the whole war will be 
found. If, on the other hand, we are able to move the necessary 
tonnage to and fro across salt water indefinitely, it may well be that 
the application of superior air-power to the German homeland and the 
rising anger of the German and other Nazi-gripped populations will bring 
the agony of civilisation to a merciful and glorious end.
But do not let us underrate the task.
6. Our shipping losses, the figures for which in recent months are 
appended, have been on a scale almost comparable to that of the worst 
year of the last war. In the five weeks ending November 3, losses 
reached a total of 420,300 tons. Our estimate of annual tonnage which 
ought to be imported in order to maintain our effort at full strength 
is forty-three million tons. Were this diminution to continue at this 
rate, it would be fatal, unless indeed immensely greater replenishment 
than anything at present in sight could be achieved in time. Although 
we are doing all we can to meet this situation by new methods, the 
difficulty of limiting losses is obviously much greater than in the 
last war. We lack the assistance of the French Navy, and above all of 
the United States Navy, which was of such vital help to us during the 
culminating years. The enemy commands the ports all around the northern 
and western coasts of France. He is increasingly basing his submarines, 
flying-boats, and combat planes on these ports and on the islands off the 
French coast. We are denied the use of the ports or territory of Eire 
in which to organise our coastal patrols by air and sea. In fact, we
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have only one effective route of entry to the British Isles, namely, 
the northern approaches, against which the enemy is increasingly 
concentrating, reaching ever farther out by U-boat action and long­
distance aircraft bombing. In addition, there have for some months been 
merchant-ship raiders, both in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. And now 
we have the powerful warship raider to contend with as well. We need 
ships both to hunt down and to escort. Large as are our resources and 
preparations, we do not possess enough.
7. The next six or seven months will bring relative battleship 
strength in home waters to a smaller margin than is satisfactory. 
Bismarck and Tirpitz will certainly be in service in January. We have 
already King George V, and hope to have Prince of Wales—in—the-line at 
the same time. These modern ships are, of course, far better armoured, 
especially against air attack, than vessels like Rodney and Nelson, 
designed twenty years ago. We have recently had to use Rodney on trans­
atlantic escort, and at any time, when numbers are so small, a mine or
a torpedo may alter decisively the strength of the line of battle. We 
get relief in June, when the Duke of York will be ready, and shall be 
still better off at the end of 1941, when Anson also will have joined. 
But these two first-class modern 35,000-ton fifteen-inch-gun German 
battleships force us to maintain a concentration never previously 
necessary in this war.
8. We hope that the two Italian Littorios will be out of action for 
a while, and anyway they are not so dangerous as if they were manned by 
Germans. Perhaps they might bel We are indebted to you for your help 
about the Richelieu and Jean Bart, and I daresay that will be all right.
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But, Mr. President, as no one will see more clearly than you, we have 
during these months to consider for the first time in this war a fleet 
action in which the enemy will have two ships at least as good as our 
two best and only two modern ones. It will be impossible to reduce our 
strength in the Mediterranean, because the attitude of Turkey, and in­
deed the whole position in the Eastern Basin, depends upon our having a 
strong fleet there. The older, unmodernised battleships will have to go 
for convoy. Thus, even in the battleship class we are in full extension,
9. There is a second field of danger: The Vichy Government may, 
either by joining Hitler's New Order in Europe or through some manoeuvre, 
such as forcing us to attack an expedition dispatched by sea against the 
Free French Colonies, find an excuse 1er ranging with the Axis Powers 
the very considerable undamaged naval forces still under its control.
If the French Navy were to join, the Axis, the control of West Africa 
would pass immediately into their hands, with the graveah-consequences 
to our communications between the Northern and Southern Atlantic, and 
also affecting Dakar and of course thereafter South America.
10. A third sphere of danger is in the Far East. Here it seems 
clear that Japan is thrusting southward through Indo-China to Saigon 
and other naval and air bases, thus bringing them within a comparatively 
short distance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. It is reported 
that the Japanese are preparing five good divisions for possible use as 
an overseas expeditionary force. We have today no forces in the Far East 
capable of dealing with this situation should it develop.
11. In the face of these dangers we must try to use the year 1941 to 
build up such a supply of weapons, particularly of aircraft, both by
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increased output at home in spite of bombardment, and through ocean- 
borne supplies, as will lay the foundations of victory. In view of the 
difficulty and magnitude of this task, as outlined by all the facts I 
have set forth, to which many others could be added, I feel entitled, 
nay bound, to lay before you the various ways in which the United States 
could give supreme and decisive help to what is, in certain aspects, 
the common cause.
12. The prime need is to check or limit the loss of tonnage on the 
Atlantic approaches to our island. This may be achieved both by in­
creasing the naval forces which cope with the attacks and by adding to 
the number of merchant ships on which we depend. For the first purpose 
there would seem to be the following alternatives;
(1) The reassertion by the United States of the doctrine of the 
freedom of the seas from illegal and barbarous methods of warfare, in 
accordance with the decisions reached after the late Great War, and as 
freely accepted and defined by Germany in 1935. From this. United States 
ships should be free to trade with countries against which there is not 
an effective legal blockade.
(2) It would, I suggest, follow that protection should be given to
this lawful trading by United States forces, i.e., escorting battleships,
cruisers, destroyers, and air flotillas. The protection would be
immensely more effective if you were able to obtain bases in Eire for
the duration of the war. I think it is improbable that such protection
would provoke a declaration of war by Germany upon the United States,
though probably sea incidents of a dangerous character would from time 
to time occur. Herr Hitler has shown himself inclined to avoid the
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Kaiser's mistake. He does not wish to be drawn into war with the United 
States until he has gravely undermined the power of Great Britain, His 
maxim is "One at a time."
The policy I have ventured to outline, or something like it, would 
constitute a decisive act of constructive non-belligerency by the 
United States, and, more than any other measure, would make it certain
that British resistance could be effectively prolonged for the desired
period and victory gained.
(3) Failing the above, the gift, loan, or supply of a large number
of American vessels of war, above all destroyers, already in the Atlantic 
is indispensable to the maintenance of the Atlantic route. Further, 
could not the United States Naval Forces extend their sea-control of 
the American side of the Atlantic so as to prevent the molestation by 
enemy vessels of the approaches to the new line of naval and air bases 
which the United States is establishing in British islands in the 
Western Hemisphere? The strength of the United States Naval Forces is 
such that the assistance in the Atlantic that they could afford us, as 
described above, would not jeopardise the control of the Pacific.
(4) We should also then need the good offices of the United States
and the whole influence of its Government, continually exerted, to
procure for Great Britain the necessary facilities upon the southern
and western shores of Eire for our flotillas, and still more important,
for our aircraft, working to the westward into the Atlantic. If it were
proclaimed an American interest that the resistance of Great Britain
should be prolonged and the Atlantic route kept open for thé important 
armaments now being prepared for Great Britain in North America, the
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Irish in the United States might be willing to point out to the Govern­
ment of Eire the dangers which its present policy is creating for the 
United States itself.
His Majesty's Government would, of course, take the most effective 
measures beforehand to protect Ireland if Irish action exposed it to 
German attack. It is hot possible for us to compel the people of 
Northern Ireland against their will to leave the United Kingdom and 
join Southern Irelandi But I do not doubt that if the Government of 
Eire would show its solidarity with the democracies of the English- 
speaking world at this crisis, a Council for Defense of all Ireland 
could be set up out of which the unity of the island would probably in 
some form or other emerge after the war.
13. The object of the foregoing measures is to reduce to manageable 
proportions the present destructive losses at sea. In addition, it is 
indispensable that the merchant tonnage available for supplying Great 
Britain, and for waging of the war by Great Britain with all vigour, 
should be substantially increased beyond the 1,250,000 tons per annum 
which is the utmost we can now build. The convoy system, the detours, 
the zigzags, the great distances from which we now have to bring our 
imports, and the congestion of our western harbours, have reduced by 
about one-third the fruitfulness of our existing tonnage. To ensure 
final victory, not less than three million tons of additional merchant 
shipbuilding capacity will be required. Only the United States can 
supply this need. Looking to the future, it would seem that production 
on a scale comparable to that of the Hog Island sche of the last war 
ought to be faced for 1942. In the meanwhile, we ask that in 1941 the
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United States should make available to us every ton of merchant shipping, 
surplus to its own requirements, which it possesses or controls, and to 
find some means of putting into our service a large proportion of 
merchant shipping now under construction for the National Maritime Board.
14. Moreover, we look to the industrial energy of the Republic for 
a reinforcement of our domestic capacity to manufacture combat aircraft. 
Without the reinforcement reaching us in substantial measure, we shall 
not achieve the massive preponderance in the air on which we must rely 
to loosen and disintegrate the German grip on Europe. We are at present 
engaged on a programme designed to increase our strength to seven 
thousand first-line aircraft by the spring cf 1942. But it is abundantly 
clear that this programme will not suffice to give us the weight of 
superiority which will force open the doors of victory. In order to 
achieve such superiority, it is plain that we shall need the greatest 
production of aircraft which the United States of America is capable of 
sending us. It is our anxious hope that in the teeth of.continuous 
bombardment we shall realise the greater part of the production which 
we have planned in this country. But not even with the addition to our 
squadrons of all the aircraft which, under present arrangements, we may 
derive from planned output in the United States can we hope to achieve 
the necessary ascendancy. May I invite you then, Mr. President, to give 
earnest consideration to an immediate order for a further two thousand 
combat aircraft a month? Of these aircraft, I would submit, the highest 
possible proportion should be heavy bombers, the weapon on which, above 
all others, we depend to shatter the foundations of German military 
■power. I am aware of the formidable task that this would impose upon
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the industrial organisation of the United States. Yet, in our heavy 
need, we call with confidence to the most resourceful and ingenious 
technicians in the world. We ask for an unexampled effort, believing 
that it can be made.
15. You have also received information about the needs of our armies. 
In the munitions sphere, in spite of enemy bombing, we are making steady 
progress here. Without your continued assistance in the supply of 
machine tools and in further releases from stock of certain articles,
we could not hope to equip as many as fifty divisions in 1941. I am 
grateful for the arrangements, already practically completed, for your 
aid in the equipment of the army which we have already planned, and for 
the provision of the American type of weapons for an additional ten 
divisions in time for the campaign of 1942. But when the tide of 
dictatorship begins to recede, many countries trying to regain their 
freedom may be asking for arms, and there is no source_to_whlch they 
can look except the factories of the United States. I must, therefore, 
also urge the importance of expanding to the utmost American productive 
capacity for small arms, artillery, and tanks
16. I am arranging to present you with a complete programme of the 
munitions of all kinds which we week to obtain from you, the greater 
part of which is, of course, already agreed. An important economy of 
time and effort will be produced if the typ.-s selected for the United 
States Services should, whenever possible, conform to those which have 
proved their merit under the actual conditions of war. In this way 
reserves of guns and ammunition and of airplanes becomes interchangeable.
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and are by that very fact augmented. This is, however, a sphere so 
highly technical that I do not enlarge upon it.
17. Last of all, I come to the question of Finance. The more rapid 
and abundant the flow of munitions and ships which you are able to send 
us, the sooner will our dollar credits bg exhausted. They are already, 
as you know, very heavily drawn upon by the payments we have made to 
date. Indeed, as you know, the orders already placed or under nego­
tiation, including the expenditure settled or pending for creating 
munitions factories in the United States, many times exceed the total 
exchange resources remaining at the disposal of Great Britain. The 
moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for 
shipping and other supplies. While we will do our utmost, and shrink 
from no proper sacrifice to make payments across the Exchange, I believe 
you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and mutually dis­
advantageous in effect if at the height of this struggle Great Britain 
were to be divested of all saleable assets, so that after the victory 
was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time gained for the 
United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should 
stand stripped to the bone. Such a course would not be in the moral or 
economic interests of either of our countries. We here should be unable, 
after the war, to purchase the large balance of imports from the United 
States over and above the volume of our exports which is agreeable to 
your tariffs and industrial economy. Not only should we in Great Britain 
suffer cruel privations, but widespread unemployment in the United States 
wQuld follow the curtailment of American exporting power.
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18. Moreover, I do not believe that the Government and the people of 
the United States would find it in accordance with the principles which 
guide them to confind the help which they have so generously promised 
only to such munitions of war and commodities as could be immediately 
paid for. You may be certain that we shall prove ourselves ready to 
suffer and sacrifice to the utmost for the Cause, and that we glory in 
being its champions. The rest we leave with confidence to you and to 
your people, being sure that ways and means will be found which future 
generations on both sides of the Atlantic will approve and admire.
19. If, as I believe, you are convinced, Mr. President, that the 
defeat of the Nazi and Fascist tyranny is a matter of high consequence 
to the people of the United States and to the Western Hemisphere, you 
will regard this letter not as an appeal for aid, but as a statement of 
the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose.
APPENDIX II
LIST OF PERSONS MENTIONED 
IN THE STUDY
Alexander, General Sir Harold, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in 
Italy.
Arnold, Henry H., General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air 
Forces, and Chief of the Air Staff.
Beaverbrook, Lord William M. A. , British Minister of Production (for 
period of our interest).
Brooke, Sir Alan, General, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
(Referred to throughout this study as Alanbrooke. This is due 
to his having become a Lord in the British Government during 
the World War, thereafter being called Lord Alanbrooke.)
Cadogan, Sir Alexander, British Permanent Under>Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs.
Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government 
of the Republic of China.
Churchill, Winston S., British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.
Cunningham, Sir Andrew, Admiral of the Fleet, First Sea Lord and Chief 
of the Naval Staff. (Replaced Admiral Sir Dudley Pound when 
latter died in September 1943.)
Deane, John R., Major General, U. S. A., Chief of the United States 
Military Mission to Moscow.
Dill, Sir John, Field Marshall, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission 
at Washington.
Eden, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
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Eisenhower, Dwight D., General, U. S. A., Commander in Chief, Allied 
Forces, Northwest Africa; designated as Commander of Overlord 
on December 5, 1943, with effect of designation to be at a
later date; entered upon the duties of the position of Supreme
Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces in January 1944-
Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador in the Soviet Union for latter part of 
period of this study.
Hitler, Adolf, Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich.
Hopkins, Harry L., Special Assistant to the President.
Hull, Cordell, Secretary of State, United States.
Ismay, Sir Hastings Lionel, Lieutenant General, Deputy Secretary 
(Military) to the War Cabinet and Chief of Staff to the 
Minister of Defense.
Kennan, George F., Counselor of Legation in Portugal from August 1942;
Counselor of the American Delegation to the European Advisory 
Commission from December 1, 1943.
King, Ernest J., Admiral, U. S. N., Commander in Chief of the Fleet 
and Chief of Naval Operations.
Knox, Frank, U. S. Secretary of Navy.
Leahy, William D., Admiral, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in 
Chief of the United States Army and Navy, Member of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.
Marshall', George C., General U. S. A., Chief of Staff of the Army; 
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Molotov, Vyacheslov M., People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the 
Soviet Union.
Mountbatten, Lord Louis, Admiral, R. N., Supreme Allied Commander, 
Southeast Asia Command.
Portal, Sir Charles, Air Chief Marshall, R. A. F., Chief of the Air 
Staff.
Pound, Sir Dudley, Admiral of the Fleet, First Sea Lord and Chief of 
Naval Staff until his death in September 1943.
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Roosevelt, Elliott, Colonel, Ü. S, A., Commanding Officer, 90th Photo 
Reconnaissance Wing, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; son of 
President Roosevelt.
Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States, March 4, 1933- 
April 12, 1945.
Stalin, Josif V., Marshall of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Council 
of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.
Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War, 1940-1945.
Truman, Harry S., President of the United States, 1945-1953.
Wedemeyer, Albert C., Major General, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Southeast Asia Command. Earlier, he was the Chief Planner 
for the U. S. Army, ^
Welles, Sumner, Under Secretary of State for United States for the 
period of this study.
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